A CONTENT STUDY OF FIVE INFLUENTIAL U.S. DAILY NEWSPAPERS--WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO COMMENT REGARDING THE U.S. ARMED FORCES IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT (1937-49)

BY

ROBERT A. YOUNG

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

(Journalism)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1971

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Appreciation and thanks are expressed to Professor Scott M. Cutlip for his guidance and criticism during the preparation of this thesis.

Appreciation and thanks are also expressed to Professor Jack M. McLeod and Professor Charles E. Higbie for their helpful suggestions and criticisms throughout the arduous research and writing process.

Finally, I could not complete my work at the University of Wisconsin without expressing a special measure of love and gratitude to my wife, Joan, whose patience and assistance in so many ways allowed me to reach my goal.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter | Page

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table | Page

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an'
"Chuck him out, the brute!"
But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when
The guns begin to shoot;
An' it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that,
An' anything you please;
An' Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool--you
Bet that Tommy sees!

--Kipling[1]

The American public has become increasingly more dissatisfied with the United States military effort in Indochina. Although U.S. participation in this unfortunate war had its earliest roots under the administration of a World War II military hero, Dwight D. Eisenhower, it must be considered primarily a political war. Our forces have never been allowed to fight the war in a manner calculated to achieve victory. The restrictions of politics and diplomacy on all phases of strategy have been extremely binding on a military organization of strong and successful traditions.

The once unchallanged American duty of fighting for one's country when called upon has eroded away in a scramble to "beat the draft" in any manner possible by many of our young men. The general dissatisfaction with this war has spread from the young to all age groups. This growing and pervasive attitude on the part of the American people has had a detrimental effect upon the morale of its

military services. It cannot be explicitly proven but it seems within reason to suppose that this morale problem may have been a factor in the unfortunate occurrence of several discreditable military performances recently brought to public attention.

The press has utilized its powerful prerogative of acting as a "watchdog on government" by focusing on our armed forces' performance in Indochina. Able war correspondents have been responsible for publicizing the military's unworthy conduct by keeping such activity consistently on the front and editorial pages of the nation's newspapers. The press then has been an extremely influential factor in shaping American public opinion toward its armed forces. Television also has had a great effect. The impact of this conflict has been brought into the very living room of the American people.

What of this attitude of newsmen toward the armed forces? It is obviously a matter of considerable importance to the well-being of our nation. The United States is deeply involved in international politics and the necessity of maintaining a strong military organization must be recognized by its citizens. It is clear that our military is approaching a nadir in public respect. Our fighting men therefore greatly need a more favorable press to return to a position of honor in the eyes of the American people. Such a turnabout can only be accomplished by more responsible future behavior by our men in uniform. America's military leadership is becoming acutely aware of this fact. But it must also be recognized by the press that the shortcomings of the military represent the actions of relatively few of its members.

These two influential elements of our society--the press and the military--should seek improvement in rapport and communications with one another. Each might profit by recognition of the unique problems of the other in order that the American public gain by more responsible conduct from both.

If it is accepted that the war in Indochina has lowered public opinion toward the military organization, what of this attitude prior to this conflict? I submit that there has been a tendency within the civilian population of the United States to observe the military profession as one of limited prestige for many years. Morris Janowitz makes the point clear in the beginning chapter of his book, The Professional Soldier.[2] The general civilian attitude toward the military appears to fluctuate depending upon the degree of stress that the country is encountering in the arena of international politics. That is, in time of threatening conflict or outright warfare, military personnel are accepted and respected in a highly favorable manner; whereas in peacetime the civilian reaction is something less than favorable. The attitude tends to be one of tolerating a "necessary evil." Ladislas Farago wrote: "In time of peace, the officers of the regular Army establishment were butts of civilian criticism and condescension, if not contempt. . . ."[3] The examples are many. This interpretation of American civilian public opinion shall be called the writer's "Tommy theory."

Certainly the lengthy commitment of the United States in Indochina seems to be something of a reversal of this theory; however,

I submit that this complex entanglement has been strongly influenced by the political and diplomatic restrictions mentioned earlier. I believe these factors are unique to this unpopular war alone. Paradoxically, the American presence in this war has driven military prestige even further downward and the press has frequently been the vehicle of this descent.

In order to gain some insight into the background of the relationship between the government (military) and the press, research methodology was devised to investigate it in a historical context. Students of history are well aware that the future can sometimes be more safely charted by applying lessons learned from the past. In this regard, it seemed reasonable to study press attitudes focusing on the United States armed forces in a critical period of our history. It was hoped that such a study might reveal information that could explain, to some degree, the present coverage of the armed forces by the press.

Purpose and Scope of Study

Proceeding under the premise that American public opinion toward its armed forces is reaching a dangerously low level and demands investigation for improvement, it is the purpose of the quantitative study to analyze the nature and scope of press comment (see Appendix A) toward the military organization during a wartime period in United States history. It is hoped that this research will initiate a series of more contemporary studies on the same basic theme. In this manner

a broad picture of government (military)-press relations might be drawn over a meaningful time span. The study is a content analysis of five influential American daily newspapers with special attention to comment regarding the United States armed forces in a historical context (1937-49). Examination and analysis will show the quantitative amount, direction and focus of this comment as presented in these five newspapers. The study attempts to uncover valuable historical background regarding the growth of American public attitude toward its armed forces. It specifically intends to investigate a considerable segment of press comment during a period when the military became greatly involved in the American society due to the Second World War and the advent of the Cold War.

The study was pointed at a test of four hypotheses regarding newspaper editorial attitudes during this historical time frame. It was hypothesized that:

I. Examination will show the sample of five newspapers furnished measurable differences among themselves in length, number and type of items commenting on military subjects.

II. Journalistic comment generated about the armed forces will show a mixed but gradual upward tendency in favorableness while approaching World War II; followed by a reversal and therefore a downward trend after the end of the war. A temporary lowering of favorable attitude will be expected shortly after Pearl Harbor, followed by a rapid upswing through the war. The post-war descent will be most evident in the late 1940s when frequent inter-service quarreling peaked over the establishment of a Department of Defense and related issues.

III. The five dailies chosen will furnish measurable differences among themselves in direction of comment toward the armed forces.

IV. The focus (major emphasis or central theme with military implications) of comment within these newspapers will be closely aligned.

The remainder of this chapter will include a discussion of the significance of the project, a description of the sources to be used in the examination and defining the methodology to be used in the study. Chapter II will briefly summarize armed forces public relations development from the mid-1930s through 1949. Chapters III, IV and V will be concerned individually with an explanation and analysis of the three major areas of research interest--volume, direction and focus. Chapter VI will attempt to tie the study together in an interpretive conclusion.

Significance

There continues to be a need for additional journalism research in the area of press-government relations. Such studies may contribute to deeper knowledge and better understanding of the relationship of these two great forces in modern American society. Within the United States government since 1937, the military organization gradually climbed to a position of great power and high visibility. This visibility then has been a comparatively recent development. The historical structure of the United States government through its early years deliberately sought to subjugate the military organization under strong civilian control. The armed forces were therefore thrust into the background of our society until events encompassing the Second World War caused the military to rise to an unfamiliar position

of power within the American system. After both the Civil War and World War I, the country sought to forget the tragedies of these conflicts by quickly demobilizing the armed forces.

After the Second World War, three factors caused the nation to accept the continuing presence of a military force that far outweighed anything the country had maintained in peacetime in the past. These factors were: (1) poor prior preparation for two world wars within 25 years, (2) the belligerency of the post-war communist movement and (3) the development of atomic weaponry with the recognition that it would not remain an exclusive secret. And so the armed forces grew, taking an ever-enlarging share of the nation's tax dollar. Today there is an unmistakable cry from the American people that there must be a re-ordering of national priorities concerning the spending of that tax dollar.

Given the extremely dominant position of daily newspapers over other communication forms in the chosen time frame, a press analysis seemed to offer the most fruitful means of examining media influence on public opinion toward the military. This study observed only newspapers believed to have a strong impact within a considerable geographical area. Each is also located near one or more large military installations and would be expected to express strong opinions on military matters.

These related factors: (1) the growth of the military role in the American society since 1937--especially financial, (2) the importance of newspapers in helping the public understand its military

organization--especially regarding its performance in spending and strategy and (3) a need for greater understanding between the military and the press that may be aided by historical research--when examined together seem to reflect a gap in existing knowledge worthy of research and significant to more contemporary study.

Sources

Some of the most important independent variables germane to the study were the newspapers chosen for analysis. Five large metropolitan dailies were selected with two basic considerations in mind. The considerations were: (1) geographical location and (2) size of circulation. The lengthy time frame chosen necessitated the study being limited to five newspapers. Two research projects previously completed at the University of Wisconsin established the validity of the first two considerations. Wendell J. Coats and Steve W. Mulkey relied upon geographical location and size of circulation as their primary and secondary objective characteristics in their plan to stratify and select a representative cross-section of U.S. dailies in 1949.[4] Coats and Mulkey determined that there were a total of nine characteristics necessary to obtain a meaningful cross-section. George S. Pappas refined the Coats-Mulkey procedure in 1950 and found that only two objective characteristics of the nine listed in the Coats-Mulkey study had any major significance. These were the two mentioned earlier--geographical location and size of circulation.[5]

It should also be stated that the newspapers were chosen with an eye toward their influence and prestige. Those used were: the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Milwaukee Journal, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Due to population concentrations in the United States through the 1930s and 1940s it was determined that, in limiting the study to five large daily newspapers, two should be taken from the populous East Coast area, two from representative cities of the Great Lakes region and one from the West Coast. The choice of a Washington, D.C. daily was a compromise between the desired second eastern journal and recognizing the need for some southern representation. Chicago and Milwaukee, although near one another, are markedly different types of urban centers.

Unlike the other three newspapers chosen, the New York Times and Washington Post were not the largest circulation dailies in their respective cities. The Editor & Publisher International Yearbook showed, however, that these morning dailies had very large and growing readerships through the 1940s. The Times' weekday circulation had climbed to 541,269 and the Post's to 177,308 by 1949. Sunday circulation figures were much higher. The availability and eventual excellence of these newspapers led to their use in this study. The other three newspapers were the dominant dailies in their metropolitan areas based upon copies sold. Editor & Publisher showed the Los Angeles Times (weekday - 412,319) to be the best-selling daily on the West Coast in 1949 and the Chicago Tribune (weekday - 982,238) in the Midwest region. The Milwaukee Journal, the only evening newspaper

used, had reached a circulation of 309,414 in 1949 and was Wisconsin's largest daily newspaper.[6]

Content analysis studies of this type frequently analyze ten dailies in what has come to be called the "prestige" press. Due to the great amount of microfilm involved in this research, it was limited to a heavy sampling of only five of these prestigious dailies. The Washington Post, Milwaukee Journal and Los Angeles Times were building toward positions of journalistic excellence through this time frame. None had, at that time, achieved wide recognition as a member of the prestige press. Obvious improvement in mature editorial policy was noted in these dailies as the research progressed. Their present-day stature led to an interest in observing their earlier style and composition. If later follow-on studies are generated by this thesis, the five newspapers investigated will be easily adaptable to further research involving the prestige press as acknowledged by contemporary journalism scholars.

William L. Rivers compared two surveys of the Washington press corps' attitude toward the "prestige" press in The Opinionmakers.[7] The first survey analyzed the research of Leo Rosten in 1937, the second was called a "current survey" (1965). The dominance of the New York Times was unquestionable. It remained the most heavily relied upon and was judged the fairest newspaper in both surveys. The Washington Post climbed from ninth position in 1937 to seventh in 1965. The Milwaukee Journal was unlisted in 1937 and rose to ninth position by 1965. The Chicago Tribune was unlisted in both surveys, however

was mentioned (tenth position) as one of the "newspapers read regularly" by the press corps in Rosten's early survey. The Los Angeles Times was not located in any phase of either survey. Its prestige status might then be considered a recent development.

Method

It was decided that a large representative sample of each newspaper during the 13 years of the study would offer a meaningful test of the four hypotheses. Four months of each year were analyzed. The months chosen were the first of each quarter (i.e., January, April, July and October), and all days of the selected months were observed for content. The comment coded involved three separate types: editorials, letters to the editor printed by the newspaper and feature articles.

The original research design sought to eliminate the frailties of systematic sampling of the five newspapers; however, locating and coding all available comment over such a lengthy time span was soon recognized as too great a task for one student. It was then determined that looking at the first month of each quarter of each year would produce a valid sample. A short inter-study comparison was accomplished to test the soundness of this procedure. The coded results of comment in a complete year (1937) of the New York Times were used as a base. These figures were compared against the four sample months listed above. The results are shown in Table 1.

In the interest of table brevity, only three parts of the research design were analyzed. These parts regarding quantitative

amount, direction and focus were chosen because they represent the heart of the study. The figure .333 was the ideal percentage sought. Although the analysis showed some weakness in the amount (column inches) area, the comparison helped to establish the method as reasonably sound.

TABLE 1.--New York Times comment on military topics
(1 January - 31 December 1937)

	Complete year	Selected period (Jan., Apr., July, Oct.)	Percentage
Amount			
(column inches) Total	3494	748	.214
Direction of article			
(1) Unfavorable	65	18	.277
(2) Neutral	4	3	.750
(3) Favorable	66	20	.303
Total	135	41	.303
Focus of article			
(1) Social	18	6	.333
(2) Political	19	6	.315
(3) Economic	23	6	.269
(4) Leadership	18	8	.444
(5) Management	15	5	.333
(6) Strategy	32	9	.281
(7) Combination	10	1	.100
Total	135	41	.303

Further substantiation was sought for the method of using a one month sample to represent each quarter in the study. F. James Davis and Lester W. Turner determined "that nonconsecutive samples of every fifth day or every sixth day are feasible for all news categories

in American newspapers" in a content analysis dealing with crime news in 1951.[8] It follows logically that every third-month coverage would be equally as valid as every fifth- or sixth-day coverage due to the heavier sampling in the present study. Editorial and feature comment also would seem to qualify as "news categories."

The coding unit used in the project was the article. It was originally intended to code individual paragraphs; however this unit was discovered to be impractical when the volume of material that required coding became clear early in the study. Most editorials, letters and features involved a discernible theme that was codable regarding amount, direction and focus.

First, the quantitative amount of printed comment was recorded. Standard column inch measurement was used (i.e., 176 to the eight column page, 22 per individual column). The New York Times presented a small problem due to its editorial page make-up. The Times printed a seven column editorial page; therefore, these editorials were coded at 1.14 column inches for each standard column inch measured. Similar allowances were made for any unorthodox page layouts encountered on the five dailies.

Second, the direction of the article was coded. Three classification categories were developed (i.e., favorable, neutral and unfavorable). Operational definitions were developed for these categories (see Appendix A). Few articles were coded neutral because the comment chosen for coding was usually opinionated in an obvious direction. The operational definitions used in coding direction

were adapted from those employed in a study by Richard W. Budd at the University of Iowa.[9]

Third, the major emphasis or general theme of comment (i.e., focus) regarding the military in each unit was coded for analysis. There were seven sub-categories used (see Appendix A) for this segment of the research. Articles containing more than a single area of emphasis were coded as "combination."

The remainder of the information coded consisted of the identification of the newspaper, the date, section and page where the coded article could be located, the type of item and the direction of the headline, photo(s) and/or cartoon(s) involved with the article (see Appendix B). The wording of the headline for each article was also recorded for ease in identification. The complete coding sheet design is shown in Appendix B.

In order to obtain the quantitative data used in the examination of the four hypotheses, the editorial pages or sections and the Sunday supplements (e.g., magazine, rotogravure, graphics, etc.) were examined for each day of the selected months in all the sample newspapers. Additional feature articles were not sought due to the excessive time required to search whole newspapers for such comment. Letters to the editor were always found on or adjacent to the primary editorial page in each newspaper.

The test of Hypothesis I was a volume and item analysis discussed in Chapter III. The criteria used in measuring the amount of comment devoted to military subjects were: (a) number of column

inches and (b) number of items and (c) type of items. Individual editorial cartoons were coded if occurring on the editorial page or within a feature article. Photographic features (i.e., more than one-half page in size or three or more photographs on the same subject) were coded if occurring in the Sunday supplement. Single photographs were not coded. Only editorials found on the editorial page or in the Sunday editorial section were coded.

The three "type of item" categories (i.e., editorial, letter to the editor and feature) were utilized in order to present a more balanced analysis than would have been possible with the use of editorials alone. Editorials were however the major analysis category sought. Coding feature stories and noteworthy photographic presentations allowed the study to include what these influential newspapers believed were military topics worthy of "in-depth" reporting. Such features were included because they were examples of interpretive reporting. Straight editorials expressed opinion and abbreviated many of the "clarification and illumination"[10] aspects of interpretive writing found in feature articles. Coding letters to the editor returned another dimension to the volume analysis. It reflected what the public believed were military topics that deserved comment. The study was limited in this area because it could only analyze what each newspaper chose to print of this type of communication.

The testing of Hypotheses II and III was a directional analysis discussed in Chapter IV. The attitudes of the five large dailies were

gauged by the favorable, neutral or unfavorable direction of the three item categories mentioned above. The problem of directionally coding an entire item was not a small one. Many individual editorials were written expressing both a negative and positive side to American military efforts--especially during the bitter defensive effort fought by American troops in 1942. Yet most could be coded, as one primary attitude was usually predominant. If no clear-cut decision could be made, the item was coded "neutral."

The test of Hypothesis II was shown on a chart in order to clearly portray how the newspapers examined collectively commented on the armed forces over the entire 13-year spectrum. This was a test of the writer's "Tommy theory." Further analysis (Hypothesis III) showed how the selected dailies compared among themselves in the direction of their comment toward the military organization. Headlines and graphic presentations were also quantitatively studied in this chapter.

Hypothesis IV was a test of the focus (major emphasis or central theme) of comment involving the armed forces. Howard Loving established the use of "focus" in a content analysis thesis when he described his methodology in a recent study of the 1969 French Presidential election.[11] Loving observed prestige newspaper coverage and whether individual paragraphs within items focused on the candidates or on the issues. This study separates focus into seven general categories (see Appendix A) more suitable for analysis.

All coded comment was examined to determine which basic

category formed the central theme of each item. As in directional analysis, the coding of focus developed one primary difficulty: some items included a combination of more than one of the categories. This problem occurred in a small percentage of the items used and was coded "combination." The deliberately broad definitions of the focus categories precluded the need for an "other" category.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

[1]Rudyard Kipling, "Tommy," English Literature and Its Backgrounds (New York: The Dryden Press, 1939), p. 1263.

[2]Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 3-4.

[3]Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1963), p. 61.

[4]Wendell J. Coats and Steve W. Mulkey, "The Selection and Validation of a Representative Sample of United States Daily Newspapers," (research paper) M.A., University of Wisconsin, 1949. Annex A.

[5]George S. Pappas, "The Refinement of Procedure for the Selection and Testing of a Representative Sample of the Daily Press of the United States" (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1950), Part VIII.

[6]Circulation figures taken from: Editor & Publisher International Yearbook (1944 and 1949), Vols. 77 and 82.

[7]William L. Rivers, The Opinionmakers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 53-54.

[8]F. James Davis and Lester W. Turner, "Sample Efficiency in Quantitative Newspaper Analysis," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 4, 1951, pp. 762-63.

[9]Richard W. Budd, "A Study of News Concerning the United States in Four Australian and Four New Zealand Metropolitan Daily Newspapers" (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Iowa, 1962).

[10]Mitchell V. Charnley, Reporting (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), p. 290.

[11]Howard M. Loving, "Coverage of the 1969 French Presidential Campaign and Election by Ten Prestige Newspapers" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 20.

CHAPTER II

ARMED FORCES PUBLIC RELATIONS DEVELOPMENT

> It is mandatory . . . that the armed forces create public understanding of their mission. No organization faces a stiffer, continuing public relations assignment.[1]

Armed forces attitudes toward newsmen have progressed through the years from unconcern and a lack of cooperation to a firm acknowledgment of the value of a favorable press. In Effective Public Relations, Cutlip and Center related the Civil War incident in which General George Meade had a newspaper correspondent removed from camp with a sign reading "Libeller of the Press" around the man's neck.[2] F. Donald Scovel wrote of the greeting given reporters by the Navy as they attempted to cover a submarine accident involving the S-4. The writers had hired a tug to reach the salvage scene but were turned away by Navy fire hoses.[3] By the period of this study, however, military attitudes had reversed and the armed services actively sought the media's friendship. The first head of the Department of Defense, James Forrestal, was greatly aware of the power of the press and its effect on public opinion. The editors of The Forrestal Diaries said:

> Forrestal was keenly sensitive to public opinion--at times perhaps oversensitive. He followed it closely, was always in touch with newspapermen and commentators, filled his files with articles and clippings that seemed significant to him and paid considerable attention to . . . public relations.[4]

The transitional period of this attitude change toward the press took place, to a great extent, during the time frame of this study.

The Prewar Years

Armed forces' public relations (PR) efforts were weak and sporadic during the years leading into the Second World War. The Army, for example, placed its public relations function in its Military Intelligence Division (G-2). With security of information emphasized throughout the division, PR's potential to the Army was handicapped. As Sidney Knutson wrote: "It was . . . true of this period that the Army's public relations machinery was not functioning to perfection. Perhaps if it had been a more enlightened PR program in 1935 the Army might not have been in such dire straits in size, equipment and public acceptance."[5]

Through the same time period the Navy was experiencing difficulties in its Public Relations Branch--also subordinate to an intelligence section, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). The Secretary of the Navy, Claude Swanson, in a memorandum to all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department wrote:

> The Public Relations Branch . . . has been asked by newspapermen from time to time to corroborate items of indisputable Navy Department origin that have appeared in the press but which have not been cleared through its press section.
>
> Instances have occurred where a reporter was refused information by the Public Relations Branch on the advice of the bureau or office concerned and subsequently an opposition paper obtained the information by establishing contact directly with an officer or employee of the bureau or office.

> Such departures from the regular procedure, while seldom serious in themselves, tend to compromise the Navy Department's machinery for the simultaneous and impartial distribution of public information concerning the Navy Department and the naval service.[6]

The Marine Corps did not experience the degree of public relations difficulty that its sister services encountered frequently through this period. Significantly, this branch of service never attached PR to an intelligence function. The Corps had recognized early the value of a highly professional PR program in its World War I recruiting efforts. Such a program continued into the time frame of this study. Beginning in 1936, Major General Commandant Thomas Holcomb directed an aggressive PR effort in his tenure as head of the Corps. The resourceful Sergeant Percy Webb was also greatly responsible for the Marines' popularity with newsmen. This colorful Marine, through his writing, was influential in molding his fellow Regulars into a unit of high PR-consciousness.[7] Yet even the Corps had an occasional problem. Robert Lindsay wrote:

> In January, 1937, Holcomb, apparently as the result of some intra-Headquarters fumbling of press relations, issued a memorandum addressed to all departments and offices at Headquarters. . . . he demanded that a stop be put to practices which resulted in publication of items not cleared or released through the Public Relations Section, or which resulted in disgruntled editors, the victims of "beats" by their opposition.[8]

The Marine Corps sought to promote public relations as the responsibility of each of its members and, in the words of one of its postwar public information officers, did not have any type of public information organization prior to World War II.[9]

A major problem which affected the PR efforts of each branch of service through the prewar years was the lack of adequate manpower to operate a strong program in Washington. The Army operated with two officers and five civilians in Public Relations Branch, Military Intelligence Division (PRB, MID) during 1937.[10] The Navy's PRB was staffed by eight military and civilian specialists, headed by a Lieutenant Commander in the 1938-39 period.[11] The Marine Headquarters' public relations efforts maintained close contact with the Navy PRB through the late 1930s. Marine PR offered another unique and effective difference from the Army and Navy systems. It worked closely with its Recruiting Bureau in Philadelphia regarding press releases and photographs for the press. The Corps though, for several years was hindered by a lack of sufficient specialists assisting in press relations.

Armed service leaders were also quite aware at that time of the stigma attached to PR efforts smacking of propaganda. The Army was especially concerned in avoiding "anything that might by any remote construction be considered as propaganda."[12] A Marine recruiter wrote in the 1938 Marine Corps Gazette: "In the preparation of publicity, every care should be used to eliminate even a trace of 'Ballyhoo' or war propaganda."[13]

As a rapidly expanding Army and Navy approached World War II, it was recognized that a more professional PR effort was necessary to properly inform the public concerning what the services were doing with its sons and tax dollars. The military was unaccustomed to

America's renewed interest after a period of more than two decades of public apathy. Hundreds of thousands of young men were being mustered into the armed forces, bringing the attention of their families and friends with them. This new national attention, added to earlier emergency planning studies done by a Joint Army-Navy Public Relations Committee (JANPRC), raised public relations to the top level of military management before the war.

The Army transferred the Public Relations Branch from the Intelligence Division to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff in July, 1940. General Alexander Surles, who in 1935 had been appointed by General Douglas MacArthur to head the PRB, was given authorization to greatly enlarge the bureau in January, 1941. A new office, the War Department Bureau of Public Relations (WDBPR), was formed under the direction of an excellent organizer, Major General Robert Richardson III. General Richardson held the directorship of the new Bureau for only six months before moving on to a new command. Surles was ordered back to replace Richardson and remained the head of WDBPR through the war.[14]

The Navy formally removed public affairs from ONI and placed it under the control of the Secretary of the Navy in April, 1941. The Secretary at that time was Frank Knox, former publisher of the Chicago Daily News. Admiral Arthur Hepburn headed the new Office of Public Relations. With Europe at war and the naval service deeply involved in aiding Great Britain in the Atlantic, the Navy PR effort continued to grow and emergency planning assumed increased importance.

The Marines established a PR division at Headquarters in July, 1941. The organization was responsible for both public relations and all publicity, including that for recruiting. There was no regular press branch included in this new PR division. Everything in the way of spot news was handled by the Navy Press Branch.[15]

The War and Censorship

Despite the limited number of personnel involved, the services had the nucleus of a workable PR organization when World War II broke. Military information acquitted itself reasonably well as the war progressed. Yet, one difficulty became apparent early. The nature of the PR function was bound closely to a problem extremely hazardous to smooth press relations. That problem was censorship, a procedure considered a near necessity by many military officers in a wartime situation but one deeply distrusted by newsmen. There were sound arguments both for and against the tightening of government (predominately military) secrecy regulations. Arthur Krock, writing in his New York Times column, offered one of the most reasoned summaries of the dilemma in January, 1942. He wrote:

> This censorship . . . is also a measure of the public safety, and as a policy there can be no quarrel with it. Until or unless concealment is used to shield official incompetence or weakness of organization, it is an essential evil of war. . . . Freedom in its Bill of Rights definition having vanished for the duration of the war, it remains to be seen how greatly the restrictions will affect those areas of information where censor and press may honestly and patriotically differ over what will give aid to the enemy, and those items which are annoying to officialdom rather than of military value to the foe.[16]

Navy censorship policies received the greatest amount of unfavorable comment directed at the armed forces by the media early in the war. The sea service was forced into fighting an extremely defensive struggle in the Pacific through most of 1942. American industry was not fully mobilized and the nation's major war effort was directed at preparing to stop Hitler in Africa and Europe. As a result, the Pacific war against Japan was fought primarily by a Navy badly handicapped in supply and equipment. This situation added to the shock of the Pearl Harbor disaster and the very nature of naval warfare were factors contributing to the Navy's reticence to disclose information.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself generated a principle, following Pearl Harbor, which the Navy used to back its information policy of limited and late disclosure. The President's Director of War Information, Elmer Davis, explained the origin of the policy when he wrote:

> President Roosevelt had laid down the principle in his press conference of December 9, 1941 that "war news, to be released, must be true, and must not give aid and comfort to the enemy." He added, however that the decision as to whether it would give aid and comfort to the enemy was up to the heads of the War and Navy Departments; which in the Navy Department particularly, meant the uniformed heads of the armed forces.[17]

In naval warfare issues arose, particularly in connection with the sinking of American warships in air-sea battles such as Midway and the Coral Sea, where no ship of either fleet ever saw an enemy warship. Naval air power was the primary offensive weapon used.

In those actions it might be questioned whether the enemy knew he had sunk certain of our ships or not. The Japanese claims were so wildly exaggerated as to be of little value as a guide. In the months after Pearl Harbor, when fighting with limited forces, it became firm naval policy that nothing would be released to the media that might tell the enemy something he did not know.

Late disclosure of naval losses in the Solomon Islands created a wave of media anti-Navy secrecy criticism in late 1942. A Scripps-Howard Washington Daily News editorial illustrated the attitude of many Americans:

> By withholding news of ship losses from 5 to 10 weeks--and by still suppressing Pearl Harbor and Manila plane losses after nearly a year--the Government is making the public a sucker for natural fears and unchecked exaggeration, not to mention enemy propaganda.[18]

Such belated admission of losses at first concealed, increased popular distrust and led to the belief that the Navy was withholding bad news merely because it was bad, or until it had good news to balance it. This state of mind encouraged belief in wild rumors. It led to a suspicion that not only the armed forces but also the Roosevelt administration felt that the people could not be trusted with information about events of the war. The effect on newsmen and the public was bad, no matter how good the original intention. A New York Times editorial illustrated media feeling regarding the government information policy. It said:

> The problem of wartime censorship is a difficult one at best. . . . Official suppression tempered by unofficial revelation may lead to the worst possible policy, which is to make public only the favorable facts . . . and suppress the unfavorable. Such a policy would breed a false public confidence regarding our position and then, when bad news shattered this, would undermine the public confidence in their Government's statements.[19]

By the end of the war, the Navy had made progress in clearing its reputation as a highly censored news source. One important example showed the change. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, once strongly anti-press, became a respected backgrounder for newsmen later in the conflict. This was confirmed in a personal letter to this writer from a well-known public relations practitioneer, Phelps H. Adams. Adams wrote:

> During the war I did have a fairly close association with Admiral Ernest J. King, who in the early days of the conflict was a target of Drew Pearson's smear jobs, and who had great distrust of and contempt for, the press, as a result. How that situation was turned completely around so that King became the press corps' most respected source of confidential information on the progress of the war is . . . a fascinating study. . . .[20]

The Army also experienced some difficulty with the press regarding censorship. Suppression of the incident which involved the striking of a hospitalized soldier by General Patton caused extreme discomfort for the Army when it was exposed by columnist Drew Pearson. Arthur Krock commented on the incident:

> In reluctant stages the War Department finally revealed that the [Patton] story was substantially correct . . . that the news had been withheld because . . . military considerations demanded it and the newspaper correspondents . . . had agreed. [The incident] denoted a trend of field commanders toward suppression . . . .[21]

The Army's top leadership was, however, acutely aware of the problem and actively sought a strong wartime information program. Secretary of War Henry Stimson assumed an active interest in WDBPR, and placed it directly under his supervision in 1941. The Secretary recognized the pitfalls associated with military secrecy and said:

> The major difficulty in the Army's press relations was the necessity for secrecy. While it was easy to agree in principle, that nothing useful to the enemy should be made public, it was not always easy to determine in practice where the line should be drawn. . . . Beyond certain limits secrecy became self-defeating. . . .[22]

The excellent direction of General Surles and Secretary Stimson's appreciation for a sound information effort resulted in a workable relationship between WDBPR and the Office of Censorship and the Office of War Information (OWI). Knutson wrote: "In general, relations were quite harmonious with /Elmer/ Davis /head of OWI/, and especially so . . . with Bryon Price and the Office of Censorship."[23] More insight into this relationship can be gained by examining a letter written to Davis by George Creel. Creel was the World War I head of President Woodrow Wilson's Committee of Public Information (CPI). Creel wrote:

> I am more sorry than I can say that your control over Army, Navy and State is not real in any sense of the word. I know admirals and generals, also Sumner Welles, and while you may think you have established an arrangement that will permit a free flow of the news, just wait until an issue arises. The whole success of the CPI was due to the fact that neither the Army nor the Navy had the right to sit in arbitrary judgment on what should or should not be printed. Time after time they disputed my authority, and I won out only because Woodrow Wilson

> hammered them down. "Coordination by conference" never worked and never will work.[24]

Davis wrote in the margin of this letter: "he was about right on all points E. D."

As the war progressed more favorably for the American armed forces, censorship eased. Newsmen became more satisfied with military information efforts. The developing air service, under General H. H. Arnold, clearly saw the dividends of effective public relations. Early in the conflict, the American people recognized the strength of air power and were receptive to favorable publicity on its behalf. Such growing acceptance occasionally came at the expense of the Army and Navy which had temporarily lost considerable public confidence due to unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor. The New York Times said: "The man in the street has been quicker than the old-line admirals and generals to recognize the dominant role of air power in the present war."[25] In addition, the Air Corps had recruited many skilled PR and advertising men as the war started. These specialists became very valuable in promoting the Air Force as a separate branch of service--a campaign that reaped dividends in 1947.

The Postwar Years

Armed forces public relations matured further in the years after World War II despite personnel cutbacks. The function was used extensively to assist the military in strengthening its forces in the face of a belligerent Russian cold war strategy. The services sought public support for money and manpower programs. Personnel

strength had diminished at a rapid rate with the close of the war as the American people exerted maximum pressure to bring their fighting men home. As a result, top military leaders sought a strong information effort to rally public opinion in recognizing the need for sustained interest in national security.

The writings of Knutson and Lindsay led the reader to believe that postwar public relations specialists, in theory, embraced the concept of open disclosure of information to the public and attempted to sell this idea to senior military policy-makers. These specialists became steadily more professional as they realized that there was a need and a responsibility for informing the public of armed services' activities in both war and peace.

There was also evidence that part of the American press supported a strong postwar military PR program. Lindsay quoted a Honolulu Advertiser editorial which said:

> There has been built up during World War II a large, efficient public information, or public relations, branch, for each of the armed forces. These should not be eliminated when the war ends, but, trimmed to appropriate size, should be maintained with the same recognition of their importance. . . .[26]

The Army continued to re-evaluate and shift its information function after the war. The office finally settled under the Deputy Chief of Staff and was headed by a Chief of Information with the rank of general. It was primarily through the news branch of this division that the Army conducted its press relations through the remaining years of the time frame involved in the study. Its efforts were

fundamentally sound and unspectacular.

Navy information efforts lagged somewhat behind those of the other branches of the service in the late 1940s. Charles Larson implied that the difficulty was not with Navy PR specialists but was to be found in the attitude of many Navy line officers who lacked a sound understanding of the role of public relations.[27] This situation may have contributed to the absence of press acceptance for the Navy's position in the armed forces unification quarrel of this time period. The Milwaukee Journal exemplified this lack of support in a 1949 editorial entitled, "Who's Sinking the Navy." It said:

> The Navy, or its high command, seems to be acting like a spoiled child.
>
> Certainly, by its stubborn opposition to the unification program, and the conspiratorial and melodramatic activities in connection therewith, it is proving 100% right the task force of the Hoover commission when it said:
>
> "Public displays of interservice friction have often gone beyond the bounds of healthy rivalry. To the average citizen most of them seem childish."[28]

The Air Force was very well accepted by the press after the war as it continued to capitalize on the fine reputation it had gained by its contribution to the allied victory. Its PR was consistently good and widespread. A New York Times editorial, "The Air Force Scores Again," for example, lauded the air service for its successful Negro and white integration at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. The Times wrote:

> The white and Negro men . . . comprising the permanent personnel at the base immediately began living, eating and training together in complete harmony. . . . The Air Force carried out the /integrate/ order and did it commendably.[29]

The Los Angeles Times also reflected the goodwill of Air Force PR by writing:

> The Air Force was quick to act when The Times revealed intolerable living conditions and low morale at its super-secret desert test base at Muroc /California/. It set a laudable example for all military functionaries by accepting the information in the spirit in which it was given and taking steps to set conditions aright.
>
> . . . Not the least of /the base commander's/ improvements is his reversal of the enlightened "public information" policy at Muroc. Bona fide newsmen are no longer to be barred from the base but will be welcome anywhere. . . .[30]

Lindsay maintained that Marine Corps PR activity after the war was highly professional and successful. Although the Corps opposed the armed forces unification bill of 1947 due to the possible loss of its jealously guarded amphibious warfare mission, its Commandant, General Vandegrift, made a forthright statement explaining this attitude but also conveying clearly the Marines' intention to abide by the will of the people.[31] The Marines wisely avoided the controversy and poor publicity that had marked the Navy opposition. This skillful handling of a delicate and highly emotional issue by the Corps showed the unmistakable mark of enlightened PR doctrine--a mark reaching to the very top of its leadership.

It can therefore be seen that the public relations efforts of the armed services progressed from an operation of limited effectiveness to one of considerable expertise within the time frame of this

study. Only the Navy effort seemed marginal by 1949. Such efforts must have had some significance in influencing press attitudes toward the military. It is these attitudes as expressed through the editorial and feature sections of leading metropolitan dailies of the time that will be analyzed in the next three chapters.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

[1]Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 426

[2]Ibid., p. 427.

[3]F. Donald Scovel, "Helm's A'Lee, History of the Development of the Public Affairs Function in the United States Navy, 1861-1941" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968), p. 124.

[4]Walter Millis, ed., and E. S. Duffield, The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 7.

[5]Sidney A. Knutson, "History of the Public Relations Program in the United States Army" (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1953), pp. 141-42.

[6]Scovel, op. cit., p. 118.

[7]Robert G. Lindsay, "History of the Public Relations Program in the United States Marine Corps" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1954), pp. 32-38.

[8]Ibid., p. 95.

[9]Ibid., p. 40.

[10]Knutson, op. cit., p. 145.

[11]Scovel, op. cit., p. 122.

[12]Knutson, op. cit., p. 145.

[13]Lindsay, op. cit., p. 91.

[14]Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 430.

[15]Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 99-101.

[16]Editorial, New York Times, January 13, 1942, sec. 1, p. 18.

[17]Elmer Davis Papers, U.S. Library of Congress MSS Section (Report to the President: OWI History June 13, 1942-September 15, 1945), p. 13.

[18]Raymond Clapper Papers, U.S. Library of Congress MSS Section (Censorship-1942 file). The editorial was clipped from the Washington Daily News, October 28, 1942 edition.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

[1] [illegible] and [illegible], [illegible] ([illegible]: Prentice-Hall, [illegible]), pp. [illegible].

[2] Ibid., p. [illegible].

[3] [illegible], "[illegible] History of the Development of the Public [illegible] in the United States Army," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, [illegible]), p. [illegible].

[4] [illegible], ed., and [illegible], [illegible] (New York: The [illegible] Press, 1953), p. 7.

[5] [illegible], "History of the Public [illegible] Program in the United States Army" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, [illegible]), pp. [illegible].

[6] [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible].

[7] [illegible], "History of the Public [illegible] Program in the United States Marine Corps" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, [illegible]), pp. [illegible].

[8] Ibid., p. [illegible].

[9] Ibid., p. [illegible].

[10] [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible].

[11] [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible].

[12] [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible].

[13] [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible].

[14] [illegible] and [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible].

[15] [illegible], op. cit., pp. [illegible].

[16] Editorial, New York Times, [illegible], sec. [illegible], p. [illegible].

[17] [illegible], U.S. [illegible] (Report to the President; [illegible]), p. [illegible].

[18] [illegible], U.S. [illegible]. The editorial was clipped from the [illegible], [illegible] edition.

[19]Editorial, New York Times, April 11, 1942, sec. 1, p. 12.

[20]Phelps H. Adams, personal letter to this writer, December 30, 1970.

[21]Editorial, New York Times, April 21, 1944, sec. 1, p. 18.

[22]Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 497.

[23]Knutson, op. cit., p. 187.

[24]Elmer Davis Papers, op. cit., (Letter to Davis from George Creel, dated August 4, 1942).

[25]Editorial, New York Times, October 21, 1942, sec. 1, p. 20.

[26]Lindsay, op. cit., p. 137.

[27]Charles Wesley Larson II, "Survival Equals Success: History of the U.S. Navy Public Information Specialty, 1945-1964" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 25.

[28]Editorial, Milwaukee Journal, October 7, 1949, sec. 1, p. 18.

[29]Editorial, New York Times, October 3, 1949, sec. 1, p. 16.

[30]Editorial, Los Angeles Times, October 1, 1949, sec. 2, p. 4.

[31]Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 145-46.

CHAPTER III

THE VOLUME ANALYSIS

> Quantitative analyses are . . . gratuitous when the number of cases is small. . . . As the data become more numerous, however, a systematic arrangement of them becomes the more desirable.[1]

The test of Hypothesis I analyzed the amount and type of military comment found in the five influential dailies studied. It was hypothesized that these newspapers would reveal measurable differences among themselves in length, number and type of items commenting on military subjects. As will be seen, this hypothesis was confirmed conclusively within the sample used.

The Washington Post

It was determined that the Washington Post led the other four dailies in both total number and overall length of items commenting on military-related subjects (see Table 3 and 4, pages 45 and 46). The Post carried 26 percent of the total comment analyzed in the research (see Table 2, page 44). This Washington daily also led the others in both total editorials and letters to the editor (see Tables 5 through 9, pages 47 through 51).

The Post's leadership seemed attributable to several factors. First, it printed one and one-half to two pages of comment daily. The other study newspapers generally limited comment to a single page except on Sundays. Second, it devoted a large amount of daily editorial

space to syndicated columnists (e.g. Walter Lippmann, Barnet Nover, Ernest Lindley, Marquis Childs, Westbrook Pegler and others) through the time frame of the study. These writers frequently wrote on military subjects. Third, this newspaper also carried a Sunday armed forces feature page during the prewar years. This page was added to the routine Sunday magazine and picture feature sections which were printed by each of the five dailies examined. The feature page, however, was dropped after World War II broke out. Table 5, page 47, clearly shows the military feature emphasis found in the prewar Post. These factors seem to have influenced the Post's volume leadership in this study.

This newspaper's nearness to high-ranking military officials in the nation's capital might also be regarded as contributing to the Post's statistical edge in the research findings. Washington D.C. area military sources became extremely valuable to newsmen within the chosen time frame and the Post's editorial and feature writing reflected the newspaper's recognition of that fact. Expanding armed forces information efforts, as discussed in the previous chapter, might also have contributed to increased Post comment concerning the military.

The Post used graphics in many of its armed forces articles prior to the war. Photographs and editorial cartoons were often an important part of editorial and feature presentations. Through the war years and into the postwar period this policy seemed to change. The majority of comment on military topics shifted to editorials and

areas to specialized occupations (e.g. voice pathologist, speech therapist, speech clinician, nursing aide, workforce trainer, and teacher) through the lens of the model. These activities frequently serve as multi-step mediators. Thus, this research also sought to identify some factors which influence why students choose the activities they do. This may be helpful in the further study, adaptation and application of the model with other populations by each of the five action contexts. The future research, however, has another other goals as it works out. Table 1, page 18, directly maps the activities, factors influencing choice to the stages of the model. These factors also go to each antecedent for choosing within individual activity.

This research's purpose is to investigate activity choices in the activity domain which also is related to participating in the [illegible] activities which is the research focus. Investigation of such activity choices should ultimately contribute to answer which the student from the [illegible] activities and factors involved in choosing those activities are consistently [illegible] to this study. Accounting some factors influencing activity choice is expressed in the theoretical model. Also have assumptions to determine that research investigating the activities.

The [illegible] problem is some of the [illegible] factors involved prior to the [illegible]. Investigation and accounting [illegible] often as important such as activities and factors [illegible]. Through the [illegible] that the [illegible] activity choice [illegible]. The [illegible] is needed to utilize [illegible] activities and factors

away from photographic features and editorial cartoons.

The New York Times

Analyzing the New York Times data also revealed a large volume of military comment between 1937 and 1949. The Times contributed 23.2 percent of the material found in the completed sample (see Table 2, page 44), and finished second in most aspects of the volume analysis. This prestigious New York daily would have undoubtedly been the volume leader in the study except for the newspaper's policy of not printing the comment of syndicated columnists on its editorial page. The Times procedure in expressing opinion was unvarying. Much of its comment was found in its lengthy editorial section in the Sunday edition. Additional feature articles were found in the New York Times Magazine which also printed on Sunday. Comment during the remainder of the week was limited to short items found on a daily single editorial page.

The Times employed a highly-respected reporter for much of its military affairs writing. This specialist was Hanson Baldwin, a Naval Academy graduate. Baldwin wrote in-depth and interpretive feature articles appearing frequently in the Sunday editorial section or the New York Times Magazine. Table 5, page 47, shows that this journal printed more editorials than features or letters to the editor. Yet Times' feature articles were found to occupy three times the amount of editorial space and over 12 times that filled by letters to the editor. Despite placing second to the Milwaukee Journal in total number of

features printed within the study, the column inches comprising Times' feature writing led similar comment in the other four newspapers. This information was verified in the complete data analysis but was not included in a table format.

The Chicago Tribune

The research determined that the Chicago Tribune, published by the military-minded Colonel Robert McCormick, printed 18.3 percent of the total military comment entering the study (see Table 2, page 44). McCormick's large Midwest daily was third in both the item and volume analysis (see Tables 3 and 4, pages 45 and 46). The Tribune also did not use syndicated columnists on its editorial page.

This Republican Chicago daily was well-known for its strong isolationist attitude during the study's time frame. The newspaper was strongly against the New Deal and relentless in its attacks on President Roosevelt and his policies. The Tribune editorial policy is mentioned briefly here because this attitude seemed to affect the journal's comment regarding the armed forces and will be discussed in Chapter IV. McCormick's staff also made the editorial cartoon a powerful instrument in emphasizing the publisher's opinions. The Tribune printed a single editorial page seven days per week and did not present a section of opinion in its Sunday edition. Sunday photo and news magazine military features were evident but not numerous. It was noted however that the Tribune wrote more editorials concerning the armed forces in the late 1930s than any of the other dailies in

the study (see Tables 5 through 9, pages 47 through 51).

The Los Angeles Times

The Los Angeles Times comment on military topics was very limited in the years leading to the war; but beginning in 1942, the armed services became much more visible in this large West Coast journal (see Table 8, page 50). The Times contributed 17.2 percent of the study's coded items (see Table 2, page 44). In the late 1930s this Los Angeles newspaper used a single editorial page. By the late 1940s the Times had expanded to a second page of opinion.

Editorial cartoons were used in the Times to a moderate degree but not with the impact of those supporting editorial policy in the outspoken Chicago Tribune. Such graphic editorializing rarely involved military subject matter in this Los Angeles newspaper.

The Times, in the early years of the study, seemed to be both "Hollywood" and "sensationalism"-oriented. Its early attitude toward the United States armed forces was friendly both before and during World War II. By the late 1940s this attitude had changed noticeably as the Times sought a role of increased social responsibility and a more questioning editorial policy.

The Milwaukee Journal

The Milwaukee Journal stood last among the five dailies in both item numbers and column inches of military comment. It carried 15.3 percent of the opinion analyzed in the research (see Table 2, page 44).

the study (see Table 2 through 5, pages 47 through 50).

The Low Income Class

The Low Income Class showed no difference between the two groups in the given budget in the study, but the groups in Table 6, the mean budget before and after training to this budget for the control group (see Table 6, page 51). The Middle Income Class showed a difference between the groups (see Table 7, page 52). In the Low Income Class the groups were compared on a second type of training.

Statistical analyses were made in the Middle Income Class to determine if the groups differed in the amount of time spent on the budget before and after training. These analyses statistically verify the visual difference (see Table 8, page 53).

The Middle Income Class showed a difference between the groups in the amount of time spent on the budget after training. The mean difference between the groups in the Middle Income Class was 12. In the Low Income Class there was no difference between the groups in the Middle Income Class, a test of significance was made to determine if the groups were significantly different.

The Difference Scores

The Difference Scores showed that during the first Budget in both time periods and within groups of difference scores. In control (1-1) periods, a one tailed analysis in the measures (see Table 9, page 54).

The large Wisconsin daily wrote little comment about the country's military forces until 1940. The study showed that in the next ten years the Journal became much more interested in the defense establishment, especially in the area of editorial writing (see Table 9, page 51).

The Journal led the entire study in total number of feature articles. The reason seemed to lie in its editorial page make-up. Although offering only a single page of daily comment to its readers, the Journal printed a feature article of approximately 60 column inches on this editorial page nearly each day. In addition, the newspaper offered a Sunday news magazine supplement which produced an occasional military feature.

The Journal often used an editorial cartoon on its front page but later relocated it to the editorial page. Few of these cartoons involved the armed services over the 13-year time period of the study.

Summary

The volume analysis served to clarify some additional points concerning military comment, expressed by the five newspapers selected for the research. Such comment rose from a generally low level in the early portion of the study to a peak during the war years. Following the conflict, as expected, this number diminished. Newspaper comment, however, never again fell to the level of the prewar period during which the press paid little attention to the United States military organization. It may be significant that military information programs

The Corps then began Phase Three LITTLE BRAVO which lasted until the counterpartie activity forces could join. The Corps planned that by the end of the 1st period the Journal Bureau must have completed a review of the activities, especially in the case of activities involving less than 5. page 32).

The Journal had the entire staff in total manner to finish activities. The reason behind in this is the activities page schedule. Although efforts only a single page of daily schedule in the Journal the Journal included a feature article of journalistic in activities page activities page daily. In addition the week-end of total activities page daily. Thus activities involved in weekend activity the Corps.

The Journal first used in activities activities on the front page the Corps included it in the activities page. The at times activities included the weekend activities over the 1-year time period of the study.

Conclusion

The review indicates having to classify some activities weekend activity activities, according to the time requirements activities the week-end. Such changes have from a generally low level in the early portion of the study to a peak during the mid period. Activities the conflicts, as expected, this number diminishes. Conversely weekend, however, never quite fall to the level of the second period. Thus when the Corps paid little attention to the Marine Corps activities weekend. It may be significant that activity between the Corps

generally seemed to improve in expertise and therefore helped to increase armed forces visibility through the same period. This improvement was seen in Chapter II. Certainly the war itself and the events involved in the Cold War were prime factors in this increased visibility, yet the analysis evidence opens the possibility of information efforts also being a factor. It should be noted that this trend was not entirely consistent when carried over to the column inches aspect of the volume analysis. When comparing the years 1937-39 with 1947-49, the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune printed more column inches, but fewer articles, in the earlier period.

In this study the daily with the smallest circulation, the Washington Post (see Chapter I), outdistanced the much larger and more prestigious New York Times in total military comment. The Post's use of a large editorial input by syndicated columnists appeared to be the greatest contributing factor in causing this somewhat unexpected result. It might also be noted that the Post, like the New York Times, employed a specialized military reporter, John G. Norris, whose writing made up a large portion of the newspaper's numerous prewar military feature articles.

Hypothesis I was confirmed. For example, the range of difference between Washington Post military comment and that of the Milwaukee Journal was 10.7 percent in the item analysis and 13.7 percent in the column inches analysis (see Table 2, page 44). Again comparing the same newspapers, it was seen that the Post printed

nearly twice the number of column inches of military comment as published by the Journal. The tables disclosed similar wide variations between the five journals in type of item concentration. These are significant differences when using the same sample procedure with all newspapers over an identical time frame.

TABLE 2--A percentage analysis (number of items and column inches) of all comment coded for each newspaper over a 13-year (1937-49) period

	Washington Post	New York Times	Chicago Tribune	Los Angeles Times	Milwaukee Journal	Total
Percent	26.0	23.2	18.3	17.2	15.3	100
Number of items (all comment)	912	804	634	596	535	3,481
Percent	28.0	25.3	16.8	15.6	14.3	100
Column inches (all comment)	31,620	28,548	19,041	17,579	16,207	112,995

TABLE 3.--A number of item analysis of all comment coded for each newspaper by year (1937-49)

	Washington Post		New York Times		Chicago Tribune		Los Angeles Times		Milwaukee Journal	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1937	48	5.2	41	5.0	42	6.6	18	3.0	16	3.0
1938	52	5.7	35	4.4	37	5.8	13	2.2	16	3.0
1939	43	4.7	54	6.7	38	6.0	20	3.4	19	3.6
1940	78	8.5	49	6.0	40	6.3	38	6.4	29	5.4
1941	58	6.3	48	6.0	36	5.7	37	6.2	63	11.8
1942	94	10.4	118	14.7	85	13.4	72	12.0	44	8.2
1943	92	10.3	104	13.0	55	8.7	70	11.8	48	9.0
1944	76	8.3	100	12.5	63	9.9	77	12.9	61	11.4
1945	99	10.8	91	11.3	67	10.6	72	12.0	61	11.4
1946	89	9.7	33	4.1	48	7.6	50	8.4	56	10.4
1947	49	5.4	45	5.6	30	4.7	38	6.4	39	7.3
1948	47	5.2	42	5.2	52	8.2	46	7.7	44	8.2
1949	87	9.5	44	5.5	41	6.5	45	7.6	39	7.3
Total	912	100.0	804	100.0	634	100.0	596	100.0	535	100.0

TABLE 1 --A number of time analysis of all incident coded for each newspaper by year (1971-1977)

	Washington Post		New York Times		Chicago Tribune		Los Angeles Times		Milwaukee Journal	
	Summer	Winter	Summer	Fall	Summer	Winter	Summer	Fall	Summer	Fall
1977	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1976	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1974	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1973	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1972	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1971	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

TABLE 4.--A length of item (column inches) analysis for all comment coded for each newspaper by year (1937-49)

	Washington Post		New York Times		Chicago Tribune		Los Angeles Times		Milwaukee Journal	
	Column inches	Percent	Column inches	Percent	Column inches	Percent	Column inches	Percent	Column inches	Percent
1937	1,493	4.7	748	2.6	1,863	9.8	901	5.1	321	2.0
1938	2,120	6.7	1,447	5.0	974	5.1	266	1.5	250	1.6
1939	2,673	8.5	3,833	13.4	583	3.0	924	5.3	320	2.0
1940	4,040	12.8	1,274	4.5	981	5.2	1,877	10.7	1,234	7.6
1941	3,049	9.7	1,928	6.8	1,099	5.8	2,437	13.9	2,632	16.2
1942	2,119	6.7	4,834	17.0	2,930	15.4	1,958	11.1	1,737	10.7
1943	4,064	12.8	4,404	15.4	2,981	15.7	2,132	12.1	2,360	14.5
1944	3,252	10.3	3,326	11.7	1,919	10.0	1,500	8.5	2,780	17.2
1945	3,203	10.1	3,158	11.0	1,579	8.3	1,228	7.0	1,189	7.3
1946	1,735	5.5	382	1.4	850	4.5	766	4.4	1,116	6.9
1947	1,486	4.7	710	2.5	658	3.5	789	4.5	893	5.5
1948	796	2.5	1,026	3.6	1,790	9.4	1,908	10.9	951	5.9
1949	1,590	5.0	1,478	5.1	834	4.3	893	5.0	424	2.6
Total	31,620	100.0	28,548	100.0	19,041	100.0	17,579	100.0	16,207	100.0

TABLE 17—Ten leading causes of death in the United States, 1900–1964

Rank	1900		1910		1920		1930		1940		1950		1960		1964	
	Cause	Number	Cause	Number	Cause	Number	Cause	Number	Cause	Number	Cause	Number	Cause	Number	Cause	Number
1	Pneumonia	202	Pneumonia	207	Pneumonia	207	Cardiovascular-renal disease	1,000	Cardiovascular-renal disease	1,000	Cardiovascular-renal disease	1,000	Cardiovascular-renal disease	1,000	Cardiovascular-renal disease	1,000
2	Tuberculosis	194	Tuberculosis	154	Tuberculosis	113	Pneumonia	94	Pneumonia	97	Malignant neoplasms	139	Malignant neoplasms	149	Malignant neoplasms	161
3	Cardiovascular-renal disease	137	Cardiovascular-renal disease	137	Cardiovascular-renal disease	137	Tuberculosis	92	Malignant neoplasms	63	Pneumonia	70	Pneumonia	63	Pneumonia	63
4	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	143	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	116	Malignant neoplasms	76	Malignant neoplasms	63	Tuberculosis	45	Tuberculosis	37	Tuberculosis	27	Tuberculosis	24
5	Malignant neoplasms	64	Malignant neoplasms	76	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	64	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	43	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	32	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	23	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	19	Gastritis, enteritis, and colitis	19
6	Diphtheria	40	Diphtheria	40	Diphtheria	40	Diphtheria	19	Diphtheria	19	Diphtheria	19	Diphtheria	19	Diphtheria	19
7	Influenza	30	Influenza	30	Influenza	30	Influenza	19	Influenza	19	Influenza	19	Influenza	19	Influenza	19
8	Typhoid fever	30	Typhoid fever	30	Typhoid fever	30	Typhoid fever	19	Typhoid fever	19	Typhoid fever	19	Typhoid fever	19	Typhoid fever	19
9	Measles	30	Measles	30	Measles	30	Measles	19	Measles	19	Measles	19	Measles	19	Measles	19
10	Whooping cough	30	Whooping cough	30	Whooping cough	30	Whooping cough	19	Whooping cough	19	Whooping cough	19	Whooping cough	19	Whooping cough	19

TABLE 5.--A type of item analysis for the Washington Post by year (1937-49)

	Editorial	Percent	Feature	Percent	Letter to the editor	Percent
1937	15	2.4	13	10.5	20	11.5
1938	21	3.4	18	14.5	13	7.5
1939	21	3.4	20	16.1	2	1.2
1940	47	7.8	17	13.7	14	8.0
1941	41	6.7	13	10.5	4	2.3
1942	84	13.7	4	3.2	6	3.5
1943	81	13.2	8	6.5	3	1.7
1944	59	9.6	11	8.9	6	3.4
1945	78	12.7	8	6.5	13	7.5
1946	58	9.4	2	1.6	29	16.7
1947	24	3.9	4	3.2	21	12.0
1948	26	4.2	2	1.6	19	10.9
1949	59	9.6	4	3.2	24	13.8
Total	614	100.0	124	100.0	174	100.0

TABLE 6.--A type of item analysis for the New York *Times* by year (1937-49)

	Editorial	Percent	Feature	Percent	Letter to the editor	Percent
1937	25	4.7	3	2.2	13	10.0
1938	17	3.1	10	7.2	8	6.2
1939	20	3.7	17	12.3	17	13.2
1940	35	6.5	7	5.0	7	5.5
1941	27	5.0	12	8.6	9	7.0
1942	74	13.8	24	17.3	20	15.5
1943	75	14.0	26	18.7	3	2.3
1944	80	15.0	17	12.2	3	2.3
1945	71	13.2	14	10.0	6	4.7
1946	19	3.6	0	0.0	14	10.8
1947	28	5.2	1	0.7	16	12.4
1948	31	5.8	4	2.9	7	5.5
1949	34	6.4	4	2.9	6	4.6
Total	536	100.0	139	100.0	129	100.0

Total Crime Rate in Washington D.C. for the Year Ended June 30, 1966 (Table 1)

Month	Homicide	Forcible Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Larceny $50 and Over	Auto Theft	Total
July	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Aug.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sept.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Oct.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Nov.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dec.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Jan.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Feb.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Mar.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Apr.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
May	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
June	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

TABLE 7.--A type of item analysis for the Chicago Tribune by year (1937-49)

	Editorial	Percent	Feature	Percent	Letter to the editor	Percent
1937	26	5.6	8	9.5	8	9.0
1938	26	5.6	7	8.3	4	4.6
1939	32	7.0	2	2.4	4	4.6
1940	29	6.3	5	6.0	6	6.8
1941	26	5.6	5	6.0	5	5.7
1942	73	15.8	8	9.5	4	4.6
1943	38	8.2	13	15.5	4	4.6
1944	53	11.3	7	8.3	3	3.4
1945	40	8.7	8	9.5	19	21.6
1946	41	8.9	1	1.2	6	6.8
1947	23	5.0	4	4.8	3	3.4
1948	34	7.4	12	14.2	6	6.8
1949	21	4.6	4	4.8	16	18.1
Total	462	100.0	84	100.0	88	100.0

TABLE 8.--A type of item analysis for the Los Angeles Times by year (1937-49)

	Editorial	Percent	Feature	Percent	Letter to the editor	Percent
1937	9	1.9	9	13.7	0	0.0
1938	11	2.3	1	1.5	1	1.8
1939	14	3.0	5	7.6	1	1.8
1940	29	6.1	9	13.7	0	0.0
1941	22	4.7	13	19.7	2	3.5
1942	59	12.5	8	12.1	5	8.8
1943	57	12.0	8	12.1	5	8.8
1944	70	14.8	4	6.0	3	5.2
1945	57	12.0	2	3.0	13	22.8
1946	46	9.7	0	0.0	4	7.0
1947	30	6.4	1	1.5	7	12.3
1948	31	6.6	5	7.6	10	17.6
1949	38	8.0	1	1.5	6	10.4
Total	473	100.0	66	100.0	57	100.0

TABLE 9.--A type of item analysis for the Milwaukee Journal by year (1937-49)

	Editorial	Percent	Feature	Percent	Letter to the editor	Percent
1937	6	1.8	5	3.5	5	7.9
1938	8	2.5	4	2.8	4	6.4
1939	7	2.2	6	4.2	6	9.5
1940	10	3.0	17	11.7	2	3.2
1941	25	7.6	27	18.6	11	17.5
1942	27	8.3	12	8.3	5	7.9
1943	29	8.9	17	11.8	2	3.2
1944	40	12.2	19	13.1	2	3.2
1945	43	13.1	14	9.7	4	6.4
1946	47	14.4	4	2.8	5	7.9
1947	25	7.6	9	6.0	5	7.9
1948	29	8.9	8	5.5	7	11.1
1949	31	9.5	3	2.0	5	7.9
Total	327	100.0	145	100.0	63	100.0

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

[1]William O. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History," The American Historical Review, LXXI, No. 3 (1966), p. 805.

CHAPTER IV

THE DIRECTIONAL ANALYSIS

> [A quantitative analysis] establishes how many examples there are to support each side of the argument and thus reveals not only the main features of the evidence but also, more important, the exceptions to them, the nuances, the degree to which the emerging generalizations need to be qualified.[1]

The test of Hypotheses II and III analyzed the directional aspect of comment about the military found in the five influential dailies studied. It was first hypothesized that the comment in these dailies would show a mixed but gradual upward tendency in favorableness while approaching World War II, followed by a reversal and therefore a downward trend after the war. A temporary lowering of favorable attitude was predicted soon after Pearl Harbor, followed by a rapid upswing through the conflict. The predicted postwar drop in favor was forecast to reach an extremely low level with the inter-service struggle over the establishment of a Department of Defense in the late 1940s. A second hypothesis predicted that the five chosen newspapers would furnish measurable differences among themselves in direction of comment regarding the armed forces.

Hypothesis II was generally confirmed in both the wartime and postwar periods; however, it was not confirmed in the prewar years. The prewar period was strongly mixed with an actual downward trend in favorability in all five newspapers during the 1939-40 segment. Hypothesis III was confirmed. This was particularly evident in the

wide difference noted in the directional analysis of the Chicago Tribune comment as compared to that of the other four journals. These conclusions can be seen more clearly in Figure 1.

The directional analysis represented the heart of the information sought in this content study. As a result, a meaningful statistical test was determined to be necessary to further establish the validity of the figures acquired through the sampling procedure used. The Chi-square (X^2) test seemed to offer a sound method for examination of the nominal data obtained.[2] This test was used on each of the five newspapers of the study. The coded data in the three directional categories (i.e., favorable, neutral and unfavorable) for each newspaper was further separated into wartime and non-wartime contexts. The Chi-square test was then done to compare the expected and observed frequencies in both contexts. The null hypothesis was rejected for each of the study newspapers. In each case, the observed data was found to be statistically significant with a probability for error (p) of less than one chance in 1,000 using a constant two degrees of freedom (see Tables 10 through 14)

The Washington Post

Washington Post comment toward the military for the complete study time frame was found to be 58.7 percent favorable (see Table 15). This newspaper traced a varying but basically favorable pattern in its prewar comment regarding the armed forces. This pattern ranged from a 79 percent prewar height of favorability in 1941 to a 52 percent low in 1938. The Post's wartime military comment rose to

FIGURE 1.--A directional analysis graph of all coded comment found in each newspaper by year (1937-49) based upon the percentage of favorability of this comment*



*All study comment coded "neutral" was discarded in constructing this graph.



TABLE 10.--A Chi-square test comparison involving three directional categories in a wartime versus non-wartime context for the Washington *Post*

	Observed			Expected	
	Wartime	Non-wartime	Total	Wartime	Non-wartime
Favorable	64.7%	46.9%	486	53.5%	53.3%
Neutral	9.8	9.0	84	9.2	9.2
Unfavorable	25.5	44.1	342	37.5	37.5
	100.0%	100.0%	912	100.0%	100.0%
	n = 326	n = 586		n = 326	n = 586

X^2 (war vs. non-war) = 32.30 p = <.001 X^2/n = .035

TABLE 11.--A Chi-square test comparison involving three directional categories in a wartime versus non-wartime context for the New York *Times*

	Observed			Expected	
	Wartime	Non-wartime	Total	Wartime	Non-wartime
Favorable	72.3%	56.5%	517	64.3%	64.3%
Neutral	11.6	7.6	77	9.6	9.6
Unfavorable	16.1	35.9	210	26.1	26.1
	100.0%	100.0%	804	100.0%	100.0%
	n = 397	n = 407		n = 397	n = 407

X^2 (war vs. non-war) = 14.12 p = <.001 X^2/n = .017

TABLE IV-4 CH-46 Pilot Lost Communication Controlling Close Alternative Approaches in a Multiple Vehicle Non-Precision Approach for the Washington Test

	Observed			Expected	
	Missing	Incomplete	Total	Missing	Incomplete
Experienced	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Qualified	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Inexperienced	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]

χ^2 (one tail, [illegible]) = [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

TABLE IV-4 CH-46 Pilot Lost Communication Controlling Close Alternative Approaches in a Multiple Vehicle Non-Precision Approach for the Dallas Test

	Observed			Expected	
	Missing	Incomplete	Total	Missing	Incomplete
Experienced	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Qualified	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Inexperienced	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]

χ^2 (one tail, [illegible]) = [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

TABLE 12.--A Chi-square test comparison involving three directional categories in a wartime versus non-wartime context for the Chicago *Tribune*

	Observed			Expected	
	Wartime	Non-wartime	Total	Wartime	Non-wartime
Favorable	48.8%	33.5%	250	39.4%	39.4%
Neutral	6.9	5.7	39	6.1	6.1
Unfavorable	44.3	60.8	345	54.5	54.5
	100.0%	100.0%	634	100.0%	100.0%
	n = 246	n = 388		n = 246	n = 388

X^2 (war vs. non-war) = 16.84 $p < .001$ $X^2/n = .026$

TABLE 13.--A Chi-square test comparison involving three directional categories in a wartime versus non-wartime context for the Los Angeles *Times*

	Observed			Expected	
	Wartime	Non-wartime	Total	Wartime	Non-wartime
Favorable	71.6%	56.6%	378	63.4%	63.4%
Neutral	14.4	9.6	70	11.7	11.7
Unfavorable	14.0	33.8	148	24.9	24.9
	100.0%	100.0%	596	100.0%	100.0%
	n = 271	n = 325		n = 271	n = 325

X^2 (war vs. non-war) = 31.57 $p < .001$ $X^2/n = .053$

TABLE [illegible]--A SIX-MONTHS TIME COMPARISON INDICATING TOTAL [illegible] EXPERIENCED IN A MARITIME TRADING NON-UNION COMPANY IN THE [illegible] SAMPLE [illegible]

	Observed			Expected	
	Accidents	Non-accidents	Total	Accidents	Non-accidents
Frequency	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Percent	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Deviations	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]

χ^2 (df= 1d. [illegible]) = [illegible] P = [illegible] χ^2/n = [illegible]

TABLE [illegible]--SIX-MONTHS TIME COMPARISON INDICATING TOTAL [illegible] EXPERIENCED IN A MARITIME TRADING NON-UNION COMPANY IN THE [illegible] SAMPLE [illegible]

	Observed			Expected	
	Accidents	Non-accidents	Total	Accidents	Non-accidents
Frequency	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Percent	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Deviations	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]

χ^2 (df= 1d. [illegible]) = [illegible] P = [illegible] χ^2/n = [illegible]

TABLE 14.--A Chi-square test comparison involving three directional categories in a wartime versus non-wartime context for the Milwaukee *Journal*

	Observed			Expected	
	Wartime	Non-wartime	Total	Wartime	Non-wartime
Favorable	75.9%	55.7%	338	63.2%	63.2%
Neutral	9.1	8.3	46	8.6	8.6
Unfavorable	15.0	36.0	151	28.2	28.2
	100.0%	100.0%	535	100.0%	100.0%
	n = 199	n = 336		n = 199	n = 336

X^2 (war vs. non-war) = 27.61 p = <.001 X^2/n = .051

86 percent favorable in 1944 then dropped away rapidly to postwar lows of 33 percent in both 1946 and 1949. The heaviest volume of favorable comment was seen in the war years 1943-45. The heaviest volume of unfavorable comment was noted in 1946.

TABLE 15.--An item directional analysis of all comment coded for the Washington Post by year (1937-49)*

	Favorable		Neutral		Unfavorable	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1937	27	5.6	2	2.4	19	5.6
1938	24	4.9	7	8.3	21	6.1
1939	31	6.4	3	3.6	9	2.6
1940	44	9.1	3	3.6	31	9.0
1941	37	7.6	11	13.1	10	2.9
1942	48	9.9	14	16.7	32	9.4
1943	58	11.9	9	10.7	25	7.3
1944	60	12.3	6	7.1	10	2.9
1945	60	12.3	9	10.7	30	8.8
1946	29	6.0	3	3.6	57	16.7
1947	26	5.3	6	7.1	17	5.0
1948	15	3.1	4	4.8	28	8.2
1949	27	5.6	7	8.3	53	15.5
Total	486	100.0	84	100.0	342	100.0

*The overall percentage of favorability of military comment found in the Post in the study time frame was 58.7. This percentage computation discarded all comment coded "NEUTRAL."

The Post's prewar comment about the American armed services was mixed. It was exemplified in a 1940 column written by Barnet Nover. He wrote:

On average Florida's [illegible] have dropped only slightly in number from [illegible] of 31 percent in both 1960 and 1970. The average value of Florida's [illegible] was [illegible] in the two years 1970-71. The [illegible] value of [illegible] was noted in 1964.

TABLE 15.--Ten [illegible] analysis of all [illegible] for the [illegible] Fact by year (1970-71)*

	Florida		Nation		Difference	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1970	17	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1969	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1968	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1967	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1966	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1965	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1964	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1963	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1962	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1961	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1960	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1959	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1958	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

*The percent difference of [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] found in the Fact in the study time frame was [illegible]. This [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] all [illegible] [illegible].

The Fact's [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. If the [illegible] is a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

> . . . The history of democratic nations at war has tended to confirm the popular democratic belief that civilian control of military affairs is essential to national welfare. . . .
>
> On the other hand, there are also many cases where the civilian control of military affairs had a deleterious effect on the conduct of war.
>
> . . . In a very timely article on "Civilian Control of Military Policy" in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Lindsay Rogers makes the excellent point that a cabinet minister "must be more than the uncomprehending mouthpiece of a chief of staff or war lord." As Clemenceau said, "war is much too important a business to be left to the soldiers." Yet neither can it be left wholly to the civilians.
>
> Statesmen and soldiers must complement each other.[3]

The fluctuating pattern of Post prewar military comment is plainly evident in Figure 1.

A marked increase in favorable comment was unmistakable during the war. The Post frequently praised the efforts of American troops even in defeat. A 1942 editorial entitled, "Spirit of Bataan," said:

> . . . If Americans are worthy of their traditions, this example of courage, fortitude and tenacity in the face of overwhelming odds may prove to be of even greater significance than the losses of time, equipment and men. . . . if all America is actuated by the Spirit of Bataan, victory cannot be denied us.[4]

The postwar period saw a rapid change of direction in Post military comment. The majority of this comment between 1946-49 was unfavorable. Post columnist, Ernest Lindley, writing just prior to the Japanese surrender in July, 1945, foresaw a reversal of press attitude after the war. He wrote:

> . . . during the war the general tendency has been to "go easy" in criticizing the brass hats.

> Many of the higher officers in the armed services, have been working for more than 4 1/2 years behind temporary safeguards. Some of their decisions have been screened by censorship. The censorship rules were a necessary safeguard to our security. But they have also protected, to some extent, officers who made mistakes.
>
> . . . publicly the professionals have not been subjected to the close scrutiny and free criticism which they can expect in peacetime. They have been living in temporary hot houses. Some of them have become so accustomed to it that they may find it hard to readjust themselves to the rigors of open examination and public criticism. . . .[5]

Lindley's statement signaled the beginning of this change of attitude in the Post. A condition that the press called the "military mind" became the object of Post criticism in 1946. In January, 1946, a Post editorial said, ". . . the military mind has always been contemptuous of constitutions and parliaments."[6] The Navy, suffering from an ineffective PR effort in the late 1940s as seen in Chapter II, received particularly unfavorable comment in the postwar Post. A 1946 editorial spoke of "antidiluvian elements in the Navy"[7] when discussing the opposition of the sea service to the proposed armed forces' unification issue.

The New York Times

The New York Times military comment was 71.1 percent favorable in the study sample (see Table 16). The research revealed that the Times never dropped below 50 percent favorability toward the military in any year of the study. It was the only newspaper of the five analyzed to have this distinction. The Times' prewar military writing was consistently near 60 percent favorability. The newspaper's wartime comment was strongly favorable, reaching a high mark of 96

percent in 1944. The predicted postwar drop was evident as the Times' comment again returned to an approximate 60 percent level of favorability (see Figure 1).

TABLE 16.--An item directional analysis of all comment coded for the New York Times by year (1937-49)*

	Favorable		Neutral		Unfavorable	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1937	20	3.9	3	3.9	18	8.6
1938	22	4.3	2	2.6	11	5.2
1939	33	6.4	4	5.2	17	8.1
1940	24	4.6	6	7.7	19	9.0
1941	30	5.8	1	1.3	17	8.1
1942	58	11.2	14	18.2	46	21.9
1943	86	16.6	10	13.0	8	3.8
1944	82	16.0	15	19.5	3	1.4
1945	73	14.1	7	9.1	11	5.2
1946	16	3.1	1	1.3	16	7.7
1947	24	4.6	4	5.2	17	8.1
1948	24	4.6	7	9.1	11	5.2
1949	25	4.8	3	3.9	16	7.7
Total	517	100.0	77	100.0	210	100.0

*The overall percentage of favorability of military comment found in the Times in the study time frame was 71.1. This percentage computation discarded all comment coded "NEUTRAL."

In the years leading to World War II, New York Times comment emphasized the growing strength of the American military but did not speak highly of its abilities. An April, 1941 editorial said, ". . . We are building a mass army, but we have not yet achieved an army of

high quality."[8]

The Times' military comment dropped in favorability early in 1942 as the Army and Navy were criticized for complacency and incompetence at Pearl Harbor, ground losses in the Philippines and shipping losses in the Atlantic. Yet the newspaper did not completely stop backing the armed forces. A reader letter appearing in a January, 1942 edition showed that the Times would not be shaken into printing predominately unfavorable attacks on the military at that crucial time. The letter said:

> . . . I shall "Remember Pearl Harbor," but not as a dreadful example of Japanese treachery and most certainly not as a blot on the record of the armed forces of the United States. I shall remember Pearl Harbor as a monument to the capacity of too many of my fellow-countrymen for complacency, hypocrisy and self-deception.[9]

Later in the conflict, the Times staunchly supported the armed forces. A 1944 editorial entitled, "A Day For The Army," illustrated this support and also revealed considerable foresight on the part of the Times. It said:

> The Army is our sons. It is even, to some extent, our daughters. Its discipline--its military culture--has become familiar. It is a part of the nation, not an alien element.
>
> We cannot know the future, but we must infer that in years to come . . . the Army will be a part of our lives as it never has been before in peacetime.[10]

Another editorial written in the same year again spoke of the importance of the American postwar military:

> . . . The military policy which this country pursues after the war, and the size, the basis and the organization--in short, the effectiveness--of the armed forces which it maintains are such important factors in the modern world that they will profoundly influence all other problems now under discussion. They will influence our political, social and economic life and the whole national psychology.[11]

The postwar period saw a pronounced drop in the percentage of favorability found in New York Times' military comment. The influential Times sought, in the confused aftermath of the war, to throw strong support behind armed forces' unification. In so doing, it often discussed military deficiencies that indicated to the Times that such a merger was necessary. It wrote:

> . . . The vitally important thing, clear as crystal since Pearl Harbor, was to put an end to separate Army and Navy planning--planning which involved useless duplication of effort, wasteful competition for Congressional appropriations and worse than wasteful failure to see the whole defense problem as a single picture--and to substitute for this traditional but outmoded system central control and direction at the highest level.[12]

An article by Drew Middleton in an April, 1948 New York Times Sunday Magazine also exemplified the increase in unfavorable postwar military comment. Middleton, writing in a feature entitled, "The Enigma Called 'The Military Mind,'" said:

> . . . There have been doubts expressed as to whether military men should be entrusted with high political office. . . . they /the people/ object to what they consider the soldier's special cast of mind, which stems from his profession. . . . His respect for authority, his belief in discipline, his reluctance to embrace the radical. . . . The result is frequently an instinctive impatience with those who do not conform to his code. . . . the civilian usually has a more open, more elastic mind than the soldier or sailor. . . .

> But perhaps the most serious of all difficulties facing the average military man in a political job is his instinctive attitude toward the people. To him the people of the United States is "a great beast," unpredictable, cruel, lacking in gratitude and good sense.[13]

Despite the postwar drop in favorability, the majority of Times' comment was still pro-military. A 1949 editorial entitled, "Brass Hats," spoke of the comments of Bernard Baruch regarding the "patriotic contributions to the nation of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force leaders." Baruch was quoted by the Times as linking professional soldiering with a love of liberty."[14] The Times also praised Secretary of Defense Johnson in 1949 for his stand against discrimination. It wrote: "Defense Secretary Johnson's directive against racial discrimination in the armed services is sound in principle and practical in its approach."[15]

The Chicago Tribune

The research sample determined that the majority of the Chicago Tribune's military comment during the study time frame was unfavorable (see Table 17). The Tribune was the only daily studied returning this result. It was found that favorability in this newspaper was 42 percent. In only three of the 13 years analyzed did the Tribune rise above 50 percent in comment favorable to the armed forces. These were 52 percent in 1941, a high of 62 percent in 1943 and 54 percent in 1944. The lowest percentage reached in a single year for any of the five newspapers studied, was the Tribune's 26 percent in 1939. It was during this first year of the war in Europe that Colonel McCormick, editor and publisher of the Tribune, sought to

influence the newspaper's readers toward isolationism and strict neutrality. This policy seemed to result in frequent hostile Tribune comment against the military. Wartime Tribune editorial writing climbed to higher levels of favorability but was significantly lower than the other four newspapers. Postwar military comment returned to near the 40 percent favorable level (see Figure 1).

TABLE 17.--An item directional analysis of all comment coded for the Chicago Tribune by year (1937-49)*

	Favorable		Neutral		Unfavorable	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1937	18	7.2	1	2.6	23	6.7
1938	16	6.4	1	2.6	20	5.9
1939	9	3.6	3	7.7	26	7.5
1940	11	4.4	2	5.1	27	7.8
1941	14	5.6	2	5.1	20	5.9
1942	33	13.2	6	15.4	46	13.3
1943	34	13.6	0	0.0	21	6.1
1944	29	11.6	9	23.0	25	7.2
1945	27	10.8	3	7.7	37	10.7
1946	14	5.6	5	12.8	29	8.4
1947	10	4.0	3	7.7	17	4.9
1948	23	9.2	1	2.6	28	8.1
1949	12	4.8	3	7.7	26	7.5
Total	250	100.0	39	100.0	345	100.0

*The overall percentage of favorability of military comment found in the Tribune in the study time frame was 42.0. This percentage computation discarded all comment coded "NEUTRAL."

Two editorials printed in 1938 and 1940 respectively displayed the sharpness of much of the Tribune's prewar comment toward the military:

> . . . In the United States a majority of the people have an intelligent dislike, even contempt, for wars which never ought to happen. They not only are not militaristic but they think vain-glorious sword rattling demonstrations on the part of egotistic, stamping little men in high positions are discreditable and criminal. . . .[16]

The second vividly reflected the Tribune's position on the prewar draft:

> . . . If conscription is adopted now . . . all of the lazy and incompetent officers in the army will be safe. They will not have to think. They can retire to the bombproofs of routine, so busying themselves with useless tasks that they will have no time to learn how to fight a modern war.[17]

The Tribune's prewar military attitude can also be seen in a 1939 editorial reflecting on the World War I efforts of our armed forces. It said:

> . . . The officers spent the first six months of the war trying on new uniforms and otherwise enjoying themselves, with the result that no war was made. As late as August, 1918, the army ordnance corps had not yet decided what kind of cannon it would manufacture when it got around to that manufacture.
>
> The army was bad enough, but the navy was even worse. A small part of it became a squadron in the British fleet and the rest of it was very busy, indeed, in the more attractive metropolitan areas of our country. Many an engagement took place in Chicago's loop. . . .[18]

The beginning of the war saw little change in Tribune comment toward the armed forces. It remained predominently negative. Navy

censorship and one of its PR officers were strongly criticized in an October, 1942 editorial:

> . . . it was officially admitted that [Secretary of the Navy] Knox deceived the nation in his Pearl Harbor report. The admission came in a speech by the navy's chief press agent, Capt. Leland P. Lovette. . . .
>
> Certain elements in the navy are as much to blame for what is happening as is the secretary. They are out of touch with public opinion and consider that the justifiable public demand for news of what is going on can be repulsed in an arbitrary manner. Stupidly, they do not see the damage they do to national morale.[19]

After censuring the United States military efforts through the bitter defeats of Pearl Harbor and early 1942, the Tribune slowly became more favorable later in the war. This, however, was far from a strong shift. In a July, 1944 editorial the Tribune praised both the American fighting forces and industry but used the article to attack President Roosevelt. The piece, entitled "That Military Genius in the White House," said:

> . . . If we have recovered from our initial blunders, the credit goes chiefly to the same American industry that thruout [sic] his administration Mr. Roosevelt has harassed; and to the gallantry of the American fighting men whose self-reliance Mr. Roosevelt has persistently, but unsuccessfully, sought to destroy.[20]

The postwar Tribune again returned to editorializing against deficiencies within the military system. Military justice, the officer corps, the military "caste system," corruption among American occupational troops and a laggard discharge rate were some of the alleged shortcomings that became subjects for Tribune comment against the

armed services after the war. In April, 1946, an editorial entitled, "Military Burocracy /sic/" said:

> . . . For the first time in our history the army really got its hands on the civilian economy during the war. It is reluctant to let go. If its hold is not shaken loose and the number of its officers reduced to sensible proportions this country will be cursed permanently by a military caste as arrogant, and ultimately as anti-republican, as was the military caste of Prussia.[21]

Late in 1946, the Tribune hired retired Navy Vice Admiral Fredrick C. Sherman to write analytical articles concerning naval affairs for the newspaper. Sherman's hiring seemed to mark a slight turning point in Tribune editorial policy toward the military. After this event, Sherman wrote several feature pieces partial to the Navy and the Tribune's comment toward the armed forces began to be somewhat more favorable. Yet, in the next two years it never reached 50 percent favorability and again dropped to only 32 percent in 1949. Figure 1 shows these fluctuations.

The Los Angeles Times

The Los Angeles Times' comment regarding the military was 71.9 percent favorable over the time frame of the study (see Table 18). This represented the highest favorable percentage of the five papers examined. This large West Coast journal was strongly favorable in commenting on the services in the prewar and war years but was found to drop significantly after the war (see Figure 1). It reached a peak in favorable comment of 92 percent in 1938, carried through the war with all yearly figures in excess of 80 percent favorable and

dropped rapidly in the postwar period to a low of 33 percent in 1949.

TABLE 18.--An item directional analysis of all comment coded for the Los Angeles Times by year (1937-49)*

	Favorable		Neutral		Unfavorable	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1937	14	3.7	0	0.0	4	2.7
1938	11	2.9	1	1.4	1	0.7
1939	16	4.3	1	1.4	3	2.0
1940	24	6.3	6	8.6	8	5.4
1941	29	7.7	1	1.4	7	4.7
1942	40	10.6	22	31.4	10	6.8
1943	54	14.3	6	8.6	10	6.8
1944	57	15.1	8	11.4	12	8.0
1945	54	14.3	8	11.4	10	6.8
1946	19	5.0	10	14.3	21	14.2
1947	22	5.8	2	2.9	14	9.5
1948	24	6.3	3	4.3	19	12.8
1949	14	3.7	2	2.9	29	19.6
Total	378	100.0	70	100.0	148	100.0

*The overall percentage of favorability of military comment found in the Times in the study time frame was 71.9. This percentage computation discarded all comment coded "NEUTRAL."

The prewar West Coast attitude toward the armed forces was clearly seen in a San Francisco Chronicle editorial which appeared in the Los Angeles Times in July, 1939. The editorial was entitled, "Bring the Fleet Back!," and expressed the desire that the ships that the Navy had relocated to the Los Angeles area be returned to homeport at San Francisco where they had tied up previously.[22] Times' comment

Response regarding the five-minutes question given to a day of 24 surveyed in 1969.

TABLE 24.--The [illegible] analysis of 24 respondents asked the question *How Spending Time* by year (1969-1970)*

	Favorable		Neutral		Unfavorable	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1957	24	34.7	0	0.0	4	5.1
1958	22	31.7	2	3.0	3	4.7
1959	24	40.7	2	3.4	3	5.1
1960	7	41.2	2	8.4	8	3.1
1961	37	14.7	2	3.4	7	11.7
1962	[illegible]	34.1	37	31.1	32	3.4
1963	8	34.4	4	8.4	14	[illegible]
1964	37	23.1	8	11.1	31	8.0
1965	5	11.1	8	12.4	10	4.1
1966	17	3.7	10	11.7	17	12.7
1967	7	1.4	4	4.7	14	4.1
1968	11	4.1	1	4.1	17	11.8
1969	11	3.7	2	2.	14	4.1
Total	192	100.0	71	100.0	112	100.0

*The overall tendency of favorability of activity seems down in the Times in the study; the Times was 12.1. This percentage represents [illegible] in answer about "Spending."

The primary main times activities toward the second figure but

activity down in a the Freshman Composition activities which responded in

the the Spending Time in July, 1971. The activity the activities

Taking the Final Study I and recommend the study time the study time

the Every [illegible] activities 5. the the Spending time be reviewed or changed

at the Freshman which the but [illegible] in activities. Times Times

indicated that the Navy was also welcome in Los Angeles.

Wartime comment by the Times continued favorable. Writer Lee Shippey in his daily column called, "Leeside," said of the armed forces in 1944, ". . . This war is such a co-operative thing that Army, Navy and Coast Guard work together so you can hardly tell which is which."[23] When General Stillwell was recalled from China in late 1944 after an alleged conflict of opinion with Chiang Kai-Shek, the Times supported him and wrote, ". . . How successful he has been . . . is indicated by the fact that it will take two generals to replace him."[24]

The postwar years saw a decrease in the favorability of Times' military comment. In 1946 the sample indicated that the Los Angeles Times, for the first time in the study, dropped below 50 percent in comment favorable to the armed services. After a rise in 1947, a second sharp decline was noted in 1948-49. The 1946 drop was exemplified by a Times' editorial in April of that year. It disclosed the growing inter-service quarreling that influenced the research findings in all five study newspapers. It said:

> . . . the vicious campaign carried on by some Navy men against MacArthur has not diminished the esteem in which most of the people of the United States hold the general's unusual talents.[25]

In 1948 Joseph and Stuart Alsop wrote, ". . . in the interests of national security, it is essential that the long drawn out feuding between the services be brought to an end."[26] A 1949 Times' editorial entitled, "Let Us Have Peace!," said:

believing that the Army was also welcome in the Legion.

Serious reasons by the Times questioned Pershing. Writing in Harper's in his early volume called, "American," said of the Legion in 1920: ". . . This war is over in each a-considerable sense that Army, Navy and Guard should work together as you are doing, until again is which."[17] Some General Pershing was recalled from Chile in late 1921 after an alleged political or mission with Calvin Coolidge, the Times editorial for and wrote, ". . . Not authorized in the Army . . . is inconsistent by the fact that it will take the generals in politics etc."[18]

The greatest fears are a decrease in the desirability of Times military reserve. In 1920 the single individual cost the Regular Times. For the first time, the is the study, compared Salem to personal in General Pershing in the armed services. After a year in 1921, a second study decline was issued in 1922-23. The 1920 study was complied for a Times' editorial in April of that year. It discussed the growing interwar-years-regarding that influenced the reserve structure in all this study recognizing. It said:

> . . . the reserve officers activated in by some Army was regular Washington has not functioned the reserve in active duty of the people of the United States and the public's should "Army."[19]

In 1922 Army and Navy Union drew even, ". . . in the Congress of United Security, it is essential that the Army Navy and Marine Reserve for service in wrongly in an end."[20] A 1921 Times editorial, that in Army Times," said:

> . . . It /the Navy-Air Force feud/ has been fought too long in the dark recesses of the Pentagon and the twilight of anonymous memoranda and premeditated "leaks" of official correspondence. . . . For . . . it will not be the planners in Washington who will determine the exact shape of World War III . . . . It will be the enemy. And that enemy is counting heavily on the disunity which he believes, not without evidence, is the fatal weakness of freedom.[27]

The Milwaukee Journal

Military comment in the Milwaukee Journal sample was 69.1 percent favorable over the time span of the study (see Table 19). The Journal's prewar comment rose gradually with the exception of a steep rise to 87 percent favorable in 1938. There was no early war drop in 1942. Later wartime comment was very favorable, reaching a peak of 93 percent in 1943. A large postwar drop emerged when favorability slid from 80 percent in 1945 to 39 percent in 1946. Another sharp climb occurred through 1947-48 followed by a plunge to a study low for the Journal of 28 percent in 1949 (see Figure 1).

Journal prewar military comment was limited, routine and generally favorable. The usual praises were recorded on Army and Navy Day and an occasional friendly feature article was written as the nation approached the war. Although the percentage of favorable comment toward the military did not diminish in 1942, the Journal did express editorial dissatisfaction with the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It wrote:

> To the error on the U.S. Navy's record for its negligence at Pearl Harbor must now be added another regrettable mark. The Navy reported 11 Milwaukeeans as dead after the debacle. . . .

> But one by one . . . it has been proved that all these men were not killed. Today only two . . . are "still dead." The Navy was not only not alert to defend Pearl Harbor, but it was not even prepared to report, with any semblance of efficiency, its losses. . . .[28]

TABLE 19.--An item directional analysis of all comment coded for the Milwaukee Journal by year (1937-49)*

	Favorable		Neutral		Unfavorable	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1937	10	3.0	0	0.0	6	4.0
1938	14	4.1	0	0.0	2	1.2
1939	11	3.3	2	4.3	6	4.0
1940	17	5.0	4	8.7	8	5.3
1941	40	11.8	8	17.4	15	9.9
1942	32	9.5	1	2.3	11	7.3
1943	40	11.8	5	10.9	3	2.0
1944	46	13.6	8	17.4	7	4.6
1945	44	13.0	6	13.0	11	7.3
1946	21	6.2	2	4.3	33	21.9
1947	20	5.9	3	6.5	16	10.6
1948	33	9.8	3	6.5	8	5.3
1949	10	3.0	4	8.7	25	16.6
Total	338	100.0	46	100.0	151	100.0

*The overall percentage of favorability of military comment found in the Journal in the study time frame was 69.1. This percentage computation discarded all comment coded "NEUTRAL."

As the war progressed, Journal military comment became quite favorable. In 1943 it said, ". . . Americans may be proud of their fighting forces, in camps, on leave, in front line positions."[29] In 1945 the newspaper supported General Eisenhower despite some public

criticism of the Allied high command during the "Battle of the Bulge." It wrote:

> . . . Gen. Eisenhower loomed as great as [sic] commander and leader in the dark hours of reverse as he did during the brilliant successes in France. By that standard, he deserves of the British and American home fronts a loyalty as complete as that he has won from his closest military associates.[30]

The postwar period found the Milwaukee Journal mixed in attitude toward the military. Journal comment was 39 percent favorable in 1946. In July, 1946 the newspaper wrote in an editorial entitled, "And Unification is Delayed:"

> There is no longer the slightest doubt that divided command, interservice rivalries, and lack of army and navy co-ordination and liason invited just such a terrible military disaster as the nation suffered at Pearl Harbor.[31]

After a steady climb in favorability in 1947-48, the Journal sharply withdrew its editorial support from the armed services in 1949. Again, the inter-service quarrel between primarily the Air Force and Navy seemed to offer the reason for the change. In October, 1949 the Journal, writing on President Truman's dismissal of Admiral Denfeld as Chief of Naval Operations, said in an editorial entitled, "The Admiral Couldn't Stay":

> . . . The commander in chief could not surrender to what Gen. Bradley called the open rebellion of the navy against the unification program and against the traditional American principle of civilian control of the armed forces . . . . these navy officers tried to defeat the law of the United States.[32]

resources of the United Auto Workers during the "Battle of the Bridge," it wrote:

> . . . Ford, discovery proved to great be the UAW's successes and leader in the dark hours of Depression as he did during the building the unions membership in Detroit. By this standard, he deserves of the British and Canadian Ford's Dagenham as evidence as that he the was from his economic military adventures.[7]

The Ford's period found the Economic Council which is existence during its history. Council elected one of Walter Reuther in 1946. In July, 1948 the membership voted 5,1 on additional auxiliary that unions, is Delegate:

> There is no longer the delegates doubt that division economic laboratories visitation, and lack of duty and many economists and Jobs United Jobs and a terrible military disaster is the nation suffered at Pearl Harbor.[8]

After a steady climb in popularity in 1947-48, the Council slowly withdrew its political support from the armed services in 1949. Again, the anti-militarist control between producing the Air Force and Navy appeal to offer the reason for the change. In October, 1949 the Council, writing in President Truman's Advisory of Special Health in Time of Final Operations, said in an editorial entitled "The Making Doubles/ Stupid":

> . . . The December in United Auto and Workmen to Walter Ruther. Reuther called for immediate of the Jerry Jackson the multiplying progress and against the Pentagon's Executive Director of existing program of the Admiral Forrest . . . . Admiral Jerry Jackson lived in Detroit the Son of the United Auto.[9]

The Headline Analysis

The headline analysis showed that the sample headlines were strongly non-directional (see Table 20). It also revealed that, of those headlines that were determined to be directional, there was a strong correlation with the findings in the item directional analysis. The Washington Post percentage of favorability for the item analysis was 58.7 and its headline favorability percentage was 55.0. The same figures for the New York Times were 71.1 percent and 71.4 percent; for the Chicago Tribune, 42.0 percent and 37.1 percent; for the Los Angeles Times, 71.9 percent and 66.3 percent; and for the Milwaukee Journal, 69.1 percent and 62.0 percent. As in the item directional analysis, only the Tribune printed more unfavorable than favorable headlines regarding the armed forces.

The Graphics Analysis

The graphics analysis determined that the five newspapers studied used little graphic material when commenting on military matter over the study time frame (see Table 21). The graphic material that was judged to be directional in the sampled newspapers was strongly favorable in each. There was no close correlation between the directional graphic material and the item directional analysis as was seen with the headlines. The New York Times led in percentage of favorability of the directional graphic material. The figure was 95.0 percent. The Washington Post had the lowest favorability percentage. This was 86.5 percent. The Chicago Tribune, which had commented the least favorably toward the armed services of the five newspapers in

The Reactive Analysis

The reactive analysis showed such the simple conditions were strongly non-directional (see Table 1). It also revealed that, in these conditions that were determined to be directional, there was a strong correlation with the findings in the time directional analysis. The Neurotics first exhibited of directionality for the time analysis was 32.7 but the reactive directionality percentage was 31.1. The same figures for the Not Sure Times were 31.5 percent and 31.1 percent, for the Control Times, 31.7 percent and 31.1 percent for the non Angular Times, 31.4 percent and 31.1 percent, and for the Extrovert Times, 30.1 percent and 31.1 percent. As in the time directional analysis only the Introvert Times exhibited some substantially less directionality compared to the other Times.

The Discrete Analysis

The discrete analysis determined that the five conditions showed very little error in detail when responding to stimuli. Rather than the single line from Table 1. The discrete analysis was the judged to be directional in the angular conditions and strongly directional in each. There was no clear distinction between the three other groups showed and the time directional analysis as the time were the conditions. The Not Sure Times had 1.1 percentage of directionality of the directional groups which was 1. The Control was 1. percent. The Neurotics first had the greater directionality percentage this was 30.1 percent. The Control Times other was somewhere in between directionality based the second analysis of the five conditions in

TABLE 20.--A directional analysis of the headlines of all coded comment for each newspaper over a 13-year (1937-49) period

	Washington Post		New York Times		Chicago Tribune		Los Angeles Times		Milwaukee Journal	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Favorable	154	17.0	228	28.3	116	18.3	193	32.4	152	28.4
Neutral	629	69.0	479	59.6	321	50.7	288	48.3	288	53.8
Unfavorable	126	13.8	91	11.3	196	30.9	98	16.4	93	17.4
None	3	0.2	6	0.8	1	0.1	17	2.9	2	0.4
Total	912	100.0	804	100.0	634	100.0	596	100.0	535	100.0
Percentage of favorability (Neutral headlines discarded)		55.0		71.4		37.1		66.3		62.0

TABLE 21.--A directional analysis of the graphic matter (photographs and editorial cartoons) of all coded comment for each newspaper over a 13-year (1937-49) period

	Washington Post		New York Times		Chicago Tribune		Los Angeles Times		Milwaukee Journal	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Favorable	109	12.0	114	14.2	80	12.6	100	16.8	54	10.0
Neutral	21	2.3	21	2.6	17	2.7	11	1.8	64	12.0
Unfavorable	17	1.8	6	0.7	7	1.1	7	1.2	5	1.0
None	765	83.9	663	82.5	530	83.6	478	80.2	412	77.0
Total	912	100.0	804	100.0	634	100.0	596	100.0	535	100.0
Percentage of favorability (Neutral graphic matter discarded)		86.5		95.0		91.9		93.5		91.5

TABLE II.--A discriminant analysis of the graphic activity (photographs and educational activities) of six social classes for each geographic area, a 12-year (1971-82) period

	Washington Park		New York Times		Los Angeles Times		Chicago Tribune		San Francisco Chronicle	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Prominent	320	12.1	334	12.7	60	12.6	320	16.5	0	10.4
Medium	93	3.1	49	1.9	17	4.1	12	2.8	96	32.4
Unfavorable	11	3.8	6	0.7	2	1.3	2	1.2	2	1.7
None	70	81.1	141	84.5	179	80.8	148	80.1	122	7.6
Total	492	100.0	530	100.0	258	100.0	298	100.0	320	100.0
Percentage of Discriminability (Wilks' Lambda value x 100)	84.1		97.1		49.1		72.5		97.1	

the item and headline directional analyses, showed highly favorable in the directional graphic material analysis. The percentage was 91.9.

Summary

The directional analysis showed that the combined attitude of the five newspapers examined was favorable toward the military. Only the Chicago Tribune showed an overall unfavorable average within the entire time frame of the study. A strong variance was discovered between the Tribune and the other newspapers used in the research. The significance of the Tribune's unfavorable comment, however, did not change the essential finding. The Washington Post's attitude toward the armed services, although favorable in the research, was not strongly so. The remaining three newspapers showed more obvious strength in supporting the nation's military forces. The findings were consistent in both the item and headlines analyses for each newspaper, but this was not seen in the graphic matter analysis. These results seem to establish the validity of Hypothesis III.

Figure 1 traced some interesting patterns over the lengthy time frame used. The wide variance between the comment found in the Chicago Tribune and that of the other four journals was clearly evident and one of the most significant findings of the study. The consistency of comment found in the New York Times was also apparent. In wartime this daily's comment was about 90 percent favorable, and in both prewar and postwar the favorability was consistently near 60 percent. There was also an obvious drop in favorability by all five newspapers immediately following World War II. Finally, the fluctuating favorability

the time and condition dependent analyses, showed highly favorable in one dimensional general or essential activity. The percentage was 67.7

Summary

The directional analysis showed that the combined attitude of the five newspapers studied was favorable toward the activity. Only the Gainesville Sun showed an overall unfavorable average within the entire time frame of the study. A strong relation was discovered between the Times and the other newspapers used in the research. The significance of the Times's unfavorable comment, however, did not change the overall trend. The Gainesville Sun's unfavorable comment for most dimensions, but not strongly so. The relation of the newspapers studied were shown already to support the activity's activity focus. The Times was evaluated as both the most unfavorable analyses for most dimensions, but this was not true in the general trend analysis. Time results were in agreement on the activity's importance.

Figure 1 showed some interesting patterns over the longer time frame used. The risk variance between the newspaper found in the Gainesville Sun and that of the other four journals was clearly evident and was of the most significant findings of the study. The remarkably of control found in the Sun Times was also interesting. In another case activity's concern was about its general favorability, but in both cases and general the favorability was functionally zero in nature. There was also no overall change in favorability in the time frame immediately following media use. Finally, the following favorability

of comment seen in the prewar years disclosed no clear pattern. These were years of relatively limited comment on military topics. The favorability of comment declined in 1942 in four of the five dailies. The only newspaper to record an increase in the first year of the war was the Milwaukee Journal. This increase was one percent.

The test of Hypothesis II returned inconclusive findings based on the patterns outlined above. There was no gradual upward tendency in favorableness seen in the prewar period. The predicted lowering of favorability was seen in 1942, however the declines were not sharp. The favorability foreseen for the war period was evident and the downward trend expected afterward was strongly evident. The validity of the author's "Tommy theory" will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

[1]William O. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History," The American Historical Review, LXXI, No. 3 (1966), p. 805.

[2]An excellent explanation of the Chi-square test is contained in: John E. Alman and David M. White, "Statistical Methods in Communications Research," in Introduction to Mass Communications Research, ed. by Ralph O. Nafziger and David M. White (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), pp. 139-44.

[3]Editorial, Washington Post, January 10, 1940, sec. 1, p. 11.

[4]Ibid., April 12, 1942, sec. 2, p. 6.

[5]Ibid., July 30, 1945, sec. 1, p. 7.

[6]Ibid., January 6, 1946, sec. 2, p. 4.

[7]Ibid., July 31, 1946, sec. 1, p. 12.

[8]Editorial, New York Times, April 6, 1941, sec. 1, p. 16.

[9]Letter to the Editor, New York Times, January 28, 1942, sec. 1, p. 18.

[10]Editorial, New York Times, April 6, 1944, sec. 1, p. 22.

[11]Ibid., April 27, 1944, sec. 1, p. 22.

[12]Ibid., January 18, 1947, sec. 1, p. 12.

[13]New York Times Sunday Magazine, April 18, 1948, sec. 6, pp. 13-14.

[14]Editorial, New York Times, July 6, 1949, sec. 1, p. 26.

[15]Ibid., April 22, 1949, sec. 1, p. 22.

[16]Editorial, Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1938, sec. 1, p. 10.

[17]Ibid., July 25, 194[illegible], sec. 1, p. 10.

[18]Ibid., April 21, 1939, sec. 1, p. 12.

[19]Ibid., October 14, 1942, sec. 1, p. 16.

[20]Ibid., July 16, 1944, sec. 1, p. 12.

[21]Ibid., April 18, 1946, sec. 1, p. 18.

[22]Editorial, Los Angeles Times, July 27, 1939, sec. 2, p. 4.

[23]Ibid., July 12, 1944, sec. 2, p. 4.

[24]Ibid., October 29, 1944, sec. 2, p. 4.

[25]Ibid., April 19, 1946, sec. 2, p. 4.

[26]Ibid., October 28, 1948, sec. 2, p. 5.

[27]Ibid., October 6, 1949, sec. 2, p. 4.

[28]Editorial, Milwaukee Journal, January 7, 1942, sec. 1, p. 10.

[29]Ibid., January 3, 1943, sec. 5, p. 2.

[30]Ibid., January 9, 1945, sec. 1, p. 10.

[31]Ibid., July 28, 1946, sec. 5, p. 2.

[32]Ibid., October 28, 1949, sec. 1, p. 20.

[illegible]

CHAPTER V

THE FOCUS ANALYSIS

> . . . Since [a quantitative presentation] brings . . . the evidence . . . into intelligible focus . . . relationships and differences emerge that could not so easily have been observed without this reduction of the data. Such an analysis reveals what events or issues were of special interest . . . .[1]

The test of Hypothesis IV analyzed the emphasis of the military comment found in the five influential dailies studied. It was hypothesized that the focus (i.e., major emphasis or central theme with military implications) of the comment would be similar across the five newspapers studied. This hypothesis was generally confirmed but some minor inconsistencies were noted.

The focus analysis was divided into the seven sub-categories listed and defined in Appendix A. Three new sub-periods were established within the time frame of the study for analyzing the focus material. These were: prewar (1937-41), wartime (1942-45) and postwar 1946-49).

The Washington Post

The research showed that the management sub-category was the unit most frequently found in the Washington Post's military comment (see Table 22). This sub-category was heavily dispersed through each of the three sub-periods, however, a plurality was found in the postwar segment. In a January, 1948 editorial the Post wrote:

CHAPTER 7

THE FOUR ANALYSES

> . . . Since it [conditioning-reinforcement] brings . . . the
> reflexes . . . into integrating forms . . . reflexiveness and
> differences among the [sic] should not be easily have been observed
> except for the emergence of the class. Then as reflexes provide
> such months of training such as special interest . . . .
>
> — [illegible]

The two-by-four design IV analysed the responses of the activity domain found in the five Schedules studied. It was questionable that the factor (i.e., motor-movement - manual dexterity) functional of the domain would be similar across the five behavioural studied. This introduces the question conditioned but also discriminations were tested.

The four analysis has divided into the major sub-categories listed and defined in appendix c. These sub sub-categories were analysed within the four forms of the study for analysing the four matrices. These were, Memory (III/7-11), verbal (III/1-6) and general (III/-/).

The analysis four

The research showed that the sub-domain sub-category the six main most frequently found in the analysis factor activity domain (see Table 37). This sub-category has usually displayed through one of the three sub-factors. However, a discrepancy was found in the general domain. In a discovery, this activity the Year group.

TABLE 22.--A number of item and percentage focus analysis of the Washington Post between 1937-49 (divided into three sub-periods)

	(1) Social		(2) Political		(3) Economic		(4) Leadership		(5) Management		(6) Strategy		(7) Combination	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Prewar 1937-41	37	41.1	19	38.8	30	91.0	39	32.5	89	28.0	44	19.3	21	28.0
Wartime 1942-45	37	41.1	7	14.3	0	0.0	41	34.2	82	26.0	173	76.0	21	28.0
Postwar 1946-49	16	17.8	23	46.9	3	9.0	40	33.3	146	46.0	11	4.7	33	44.0
Total	90	100.0	49	100.0	33	100.0	120	100.0	317	100.0	228	100.0	75	100.0

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible] (3)		[illegible] (2)		[illegible] (1)		[illegible] (1)		[illegible] (2)		[illegible] (4)		[illegible] (1)		

[illegible]
[illegible]

> In seeking a means to halt the leakage of information vital to the national security, Defense Secretary Forrestal must compromise between two dangers. One . . . is the harm that can be done if through indescretion important data in the realm of military research and technical progress continue to be made available to potential enemies . . . . The danger on the other side is that the corrective will be more extreme than necessary. . . .[2]

This editorial was an example of Post comment focusing on military management after World War II.

Table 22 also revealed that armed forces' strategy was often the point of emphasis in Post comment. This sub-category was mentioned second only to management in this newspaper. It was readily seen that the great majority of this material was written during the wartime period. This area of comment was found to center predominately on American military accomplishments or setbacks in armed conflict with the enemy.

The writer watched closely throughout the research for press comment regarding attitudes on defense spending. Little was forthcoming. (Economic items ranked last among the study's seven sub-categories.) It was interesting to note, however, that the limited Post economic comment was confined almost exclusively to the prewar period. Thirty of the 33 coded Post economic items were found during this sub-period. It should also be stated that additional economic comment was found in several items coded as combination. Economic and other focus sub-categories were often noted in the same article. This situation was readily apparent in an editorial written in July, 1940 that said: " . . . We are assured billions for defense. What we lack is the organization and intelligent leadership required for

In speaking a phrase is said the language of instructions vital to the national security, Defense Secretary Forrestal said recently [illegible] . . . . In the [illegible] can be done if [illegible] laboratories supplied data to the media of military [illegible] and technical programs continue to be made available to [illegible] . . . . The danger to the armed [illegible] the scientists will be also [illegible] . . . .[7]

This editorial was an example of Post support towards utilizing management after World War II.

Table II also revealed that Armed Forces' activity was often the point of emphasis in Post comment. This sub-category was mentioned second only to management in this period. In one reality even that the great authority of this editorial was written during the wartime period. This type of comment was found to center predominantly on American military preparedness or activities in armed conflict with the enemy.

The writer noticed clearly throughout the research the general recording activities on defense spending. Little was [illegible]. [Economic items tended lower among the study's seven sub-categories.] It was interesting to note, however, that the Digest Post editorial comment was emphasized relatively in the [illegible] period. Thirty of the 11 cited Post editorial items were found during this pre-period. It should also be stated that additional economic comment was found in general items coded as [illegible]. Economic and other items sub-categories were often found in the same article. This situation was reading agreement in an editorial entitled [illegible] [illegible] . . . . We are spending billions for defense. Now we have to use expenditures and intelligent leadership required to

their effective utilization."[3] This editorial touched each of three sub-categories: management, economic and leadership. The Post led all study newspapers in the number of individual items classified in this manner. Eight and two-tenths percent of all Post items were placed in this sub-category.

The New York Times

The New York Times focused the greatest amount of its published military comment in the sub-category of strategy (see Table 23). The majority of this opinion was published in the wartime sub-period. However, military planning and preparedness was also heavily emphasized in the late prewar period. In a July, 1942 editorial entitled, "The Navy Relaxes Perfectionism Somewhat," Arthur Krock wrote:

> . . . pleas were made repeatedly without result in newspaper departments like this one long after it had become evident that existing anti-submarine methods were insufficient. . . . it is higher than high time for the Navy to concentrate all anti-submarine craft off our coasts.[4]

This recommendation by Krock was an excellent example of Times' comment regarding armed forces' strategic planning. The Times was particularly outspoken against the strategy employed by the American military in 1942. That year ranked as one of the most unsuccessful in United States military history. Such factors as the shock and disillusionment of public and Army/Navy complacency leading to Pearl Harbor, the successful invasion by the Japanese of the Aleutian Islands, and severe naval and troop losses in the Solomon Islands caused considerable critical comment in this eminent New York newspaper

Lucky-strength initiative.[56] This activity lasted week to three sub-activities: Entertainment, recreation and leadership. The *Tour* had all study-conference in the number of individual items identified in this manner. Eight and one-tenth percent of all *Tour* items were placed in this sub-category.

The New Life Issue

The *New Life Issue* focused the greatest number of its evaluated activity counts in the sub-category of religion (see Table C1). The majority of this emphasis was indicated in the section pre-service. However, military chaplains and representatives was also heavily emphasized in the late wartime period. In a July, 1945 editorial entitled, "We Help Believe Protestant Value Essential," Arthur Ziegler writes:

> . . . Some were made immediately without result in conversions (particularly since this took place at the beginning of the Chaplain's Corps, and chaplains were inexperienced). . . . It is the religious work which has not been in evidence. It is the worship which only our chaplains.[57]

This contradiction is given here by analyzing samples of *Tour* issues regarding their focused coverage planning. The *Tour* was particularly interested in the activity assigned to the chaplains willing to give. This year should be one of the most encouraging in United States military history. Most factors of the armed and distinctness of public and Army institutions finding in their mission, the successful carrying of the religious of our time in Italy, the growth and the strong cause of the Soldiers and the human resources expressed through in this account the *Tour* emphasis

TABLE 23.--A number of item and percentage focus analysis of the New York Times between 1937-49 (divided into three sub-periods)

	(1) Social		(2) Political		(3) Economic		(4) Leadership		(5) Management		(6) Strategy		(7) Combination	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Prewar 1937-41	32	26.0	14	40.0	24	72.7	32	25.4	76	40.9	39	13.7	10	63.0
Wartime 1942-45	68	55.2	3	8.6	2	6.0	58	46.0	41	22.1	239	83.8	2	12.0
Postwar 1946-49	23	18.8	18	51.4	7	21.3	36	28.6	69	37.0	7	2.5	4	25.0
Total	123	100.0	35	100.0	33	100.0	126	100.0	186	100.0	285	100.0	16	100.0

during the first year of the war. Strategy continued to be heavily editorialized through the war but was dramatically reversed in direction as was seen in Chapter IV.

Armed forces' management was the second most popular theme. The Times utilized this sub-category nearly equally in both the prewar and postwar contexts. The postwar period saw the advent of a military organizational crisis that kept armed forces management extremely visible on most of the opinion pages of the country's newspapers. This crisis involved military unification and the establishment of the Department of Defense.

The Times printed frequent socially significant comment regarding the military. For purposes of this study all comment concerning armed forces' censorship and propaganda activity was classified as social. During the early part of the war the Times editorialized extensively on this topic. Many reader letters on the subject were also printed by the Times.

The Chicago Tribune

The Chicago Tribune was found to place its primary focal emphasis in this study on the management sub-category (see Table 24). This emphasis was evenly spread over the three sub-periods outlined earlier. Typical of prewar Tribune comment was this editorial entitled, "An Army or a Mob?," that deplored the Army's southern training camps:

> . . . If the army will bring up the rest of our troops from the concentration camps in the south . . . put them in decent barracks

during the first year of the war. Military conflicts to be readily additionalized through the war but was immediately reversed in direction to war years in Chapter II.

Great Powers' challenges, war has arrived over popular issues. The Times maintained this sub-category usually equally in both the power and various contexts. The nuclear period was the advent of a military organizational crisis level and spread Soviet management extremely visible on most of the relative power of the country's war-powers. This crisis involved military mobilization and the mobilization of the Department of Defense.

The Times printed frequent, mainly significant comment regarding the military. For purposes of this study all comment concerning armed forces' measuring and unengaged activity was classified as social. During the early part of the war the Times editorialized extensively on this topic. Many reader letters on the subject were also printed by the Times.

The Chicago Tribune

The Chicago Tribune was found to place the strongest focus emphasis in this group on the Congressional subcategory (see Table III). This emphasis was already spread over the three sub-categories mentioned earlier. Typical of newer Tribune comment was this editorial entitled, "An Army or a Mob?" that declares the Army's authority training course:

. . . If the army will bring up the rear of our troops from the concentration camps in the south . . . yet then is never particular

TABLE 24.--A number of item and percentage focus analysis of the Chicago Tribune between 1937-49 (divided into three sub-periods)

	(1) Social		(2) Political		(3) Economic		(4) Leadership		(5) Management		(6) Strategy		(7) Combination	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Prewar 1937-41	22	29.3	30	45.4	4	33.4	29	25.7	61	34.7	35	22.9	12	30.8
Wartime 1942-45	40	53.3	15	22.7	4	33.3	50	44.2	56	31.8	90	58.8	15	38.4
Postwar 1946-49	13	17.4	21	31.9	4	33.3	34	30.1	59	33.5	28	18.3	12	30.8
Total	75	100.0	66	100.0	12	100.0	113	100.0	176	100.0	153	100.0	39	100.0

where they will be afforded opportunities for recreation, and then require military deportment of them, we will create an army. Otherwise, it will continue to be a mob.[5]

During the war the Tribune continued to comment strongly on armed forces' management weaknesses. An April, 1942 editorial concerning the burning of the troopship Normandie at a New York pier said:

> . . . the /Normandie/ disaster uncovered gross inefficiency and division of authority in the navy department . . . . The spectacle of an organization sitting complacently by, unable to guard against recurrent fires from the same cause in what is essentially a routine industrial operation does not inspire confidence in the /organization's/ ability . . . to direct the delicate and hazardous operations of naval warfare.[6]

The Tribune's attitude toward military management eased somewhat following World War II, but the theme was still Colonel McCormick's favorite when editorializing about the armed services. Universal Military Training was an aspect of postwar military management that caused frequent comment. An April, 1949 letter published in the Tribune reflected public interest in the new military draft. It was written by an army draftee. He wrote from Camp Gordon, Georgia:

> I fear that the ordinary citizen is unaware of the plight of the draftee under the new draft setup that Truman put over on Congress. The morale of the . . . draftees in the army is rather low at present. . . .[7]

Articles concerning the strategy sub-category with the predominate emphasis in wartime were the Tribune's second heaviest area of concentration. This large Chicago daily also commented often

on military leadership. General Douglas MacArthur received significant support editorially in the Tribune. He was called "one of the great captains of all time" and lauded as a "statesman" in an editorial at the end of the war.[8]

The Los Angeles Times

The Los Angeles Times placed its strongest focal emphasis on strategy during the war (see Table 25). Management was located in second place. This large Los Angeles journal carried the respected Walter Lippmann column, "Today and Tomorrow." One of Lippman's 1944 columns illustrated the type of writing regarding strategy that was generally found in the Los Angeles Times. He wrote:

> . . . the grand strategy under which Americans are waging war in the Pacific and in Europe has been determined by the high command of the American Navy and the American Army. . . . it is their [American citizens] right to know that the issue [the war's outcome] is staked on a strategical plan which has been determined by the long-considered and deepest professional convictions of the American Army and the American Navy.[9]

Management comment was found well dispersed among the three sub-periods; however, the armed forces' unification struggle in the late 1940s seemed to result in somewhat more management emphasis during the postwar segment.

The Milwaukee Journal

Military management became the most frequent opinion subcategory found in the Milwaukee Journal portion of the research (see Table 26). The Journal deviated slightly from the other newspapers

TABLE 25.--A number of item and percentage focus analysis of the Los Angeles *Times* between 1937-49 (divided into three sub-periods)

	(1) Social		(2) Political		(3) Economic		(4) Leadership		(5) Management		(6) Strategy		(7) Combination	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Prewar 1937-41	12	12.2	11	34.4	10	40.0	16	16.3	47	30.4	28	15.8	2	18.3
Wartime 1942-45	55	56.1	7	21.9	2	16.0	49	50.0	48	30.9	126	71.2	4	36.3
Postwar 1946-49	31	31.7	14	43.7	13	44.0	33	33.7	60	38.7	23	13.0	5	45.4
Total	98	100.0	32	100.0	25	100.0	98	100.0	155	100.0	177	100.0	11	100.0

TABLE 26.--A number of item and percentage focus analysis of the Milwaukee Journal between 1937-49 (divided into three sub-periods)

	(1) Social		(2) Political		(3) Economic		(4) Leadership		(5) Management		(6) Strategy		(7) Combination	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Prewar 1937-41	21	28.8	9	37.5	9	64.3	26	19.4	46	28.0	31	31.3	1	3.7
Wartime 1942-45	27	37.0	7	29.2	1	7.1	66	49.3	43	26.3	64	64.6	6	22.3
Postwar 1946-49	25	34.2	8	33.3	4	28.6	42	31.3	75	45.7	4	4.1	20	74.0
Total	73	100.0	24	100.0	14	100.0	134	100.0	164	100.0	99	100.0	27	100.0

examined in that the leadership sub-category was second. A wartime editorial about American soldiers in training camp exemplified the Journal's attitude toward the military in a management situation. It said:

> After careful survey of army camps the office of war information reports that the American people may well be proud of the sobriety and general behavior of our troops in training. . . . they are wholesome beyond anything hoped for by military leaders here or elsewhere. . . .[10]

The Journal often commented on the quality of leadership displayed in the armed forces. Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur and Marshall and Admirals Nimitz and King were mentioned frequently in all forms of comment. Strategy slipped to third place for the first time in the analysis of the five newspapers.

Summary

It was noted with interest that the economic sub-category ranked last among the seven tested. It should not, however, be assumed that these newspapers avoided comment on military financial matters. As mentioned in the Washington Post analysis, many articles coded in the combination sub-category contained comment on military spending. A re-check of the research coding confirmed that this was frequently true of all five newspapers analyzed.

It should also be mentioned that each of these five influential dailies jealously guarded the American society's First Amendment freedom by commenting freely on military censorship policies in the World War II period. The New York Times seemed to lead the press in

resulted in that the Lendrickit anti-aircraft gun command. A serious editorial from American soldiers is leveling from modified the Journal's criticism having the military in a misleading situation. It said:

> After careful survey of many areas the office of war information reports that the American people may well be proud of the soldiers, well qualified behavior of our troops in England. . . . They are stationed beyond supervision owned the by military leaders here or elsewhere. . . .[10]

The Journal often commented on the quality of leadership displayed in the armed forces. Generals Eisenhower, Doolittle and Bonsall and admirals Mitscher and King were mentioned frequently in all forms of criticism. Strongly stirred by moral issues for the first time in the history of the Jim Crowdrome.

Summary

In the period with increased with the economic anti-strategy caused last month the never ended. It should not, however, be assumed that these conditions affected morale in military Tuscaloosa matters. As mentioned in the Tuscaloosa Times editorial, many articles added in the negotiated air-military conditions demand in military speaking. A review of the research writing conditions that kind was frequently lost at all five contemporary analyses.

It should also be considered that what if these five individual dailies jointly guarded the American society's first concerns freedom by presenting freely an military unmanagable relations in the World War II period. The New York Times seemed to lead the press in

deploring the early wartime military information policies. It wrote in October, 1942: ". . . The practice of withholding bad news, or making good news sound even better than it is, is costing the armed services heavily in loss of public confidence."[11] Although it did not rank high among the seven areas of focal analysis, the social sub-category was a significant area of comment in all newspapers of the study.

Hypothesis IV seemed to be confirmed regarding the most frequently found sub-categories. In all newspapers except the Milwaukee Journal, the most heavily used themes were either management or strategy. In the Journal, management led but leadership edged into second place and pushed strategy into third position. The finding of either management or strategy at or near the top among the seven sub-categories tested in each newspaper seemed to confirm Hypothesis IV for the leading sub-categories.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

[1]William O. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History," The American Historical Review, LXXI, No. 3 (1966), p. 805.

[2]Editorial, Washington Post, January 23, 1948, sec. 1, p. 20.

[3]Ibid., July 5, 1940, sec. 1, p. 8.

[4]Editorial, New York Times, July 2, 1942, sec. 1, p. 20.

[5]Editorial, Chicago Tribune, October 12, 1941, sec. 1, p. 18.

[6]Ibid., April 21, 1942, sec. 1, p. 12.

[7]Letter to the Editor, Chicago Tribune, April 18, 1949, sec. 1, p. 26.

[8]Editorial, Chicago Tribune, October 16, 1945, sec. 1, p. 10.

[9]Editorial, Los Angeles Times, April 4, 1944, sec. 2, p. 4.

[10]Editorial, Milwaukee Journal, January 3, 1943, sec. 5, p. 2.

[11]Editorial, New York Times, October 23, 1942, sec. 1, p. 20.

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHAPTER 1

[1]William S. Lynchville, "Quantification in Biology," The American Laboratory Review, 1962, No. 3 (July), p. 20.

[2]Anthony, Washington Post, January 21, 1968, sec. 3, p. 1.

[3]Time, July 21, 1967, sec. 2, p. 6.

[4]Anthony, New York Times, May 2, 1967, sec. 2, p. 1.

[5]Anthony, Chicago Tribune, October 17, 1967, sec. 2, p. 10.

[6]Time, April 26, 1967, sec. 2, p. 1.

[7]Lance de Bee Gibson, Chicago Tribune, April 24, 1967, sec. 2, p. 10.

[8]Anthony, Chicago Tribune, October 21, 1967, sec. 2, p. 10.

[9]Anthony, The Washington Times, April 2, 1968, sec. 1, p. 1.

[10]Anthony, Atlanta Journal, January 2, 1968, sec. 1, p. 1.

[11]Anthony, New York Times, October 21, 1967, sec. 2, p. 1.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONCLUSION

> Quantitative procedures by no means preclude, nor indeed can they possibly eliminate, the use of value judgments, speculations, intelligent guesses or the imagination and intuitive feel which the historian, and . . . the social scientist, should bring to his subject. What is gained by attempting such exactitude as the circumstances allow is not finality but reasonable credibility, not the elimination of subjective factors but the minimizing of their role.[1]

The purpose of this study was to examine a segment of press comment regarding the American military organization during a period when the armed forces became greatly involved in the American society, due to the Second World War and the advent of the Cold War.

The author's basic "Tommy theory" was formed over several years of both educational and military experience. However, the thought of expanding and testing the validity of the theory did not occur until recently. It was also recognized that the theory was not original, but an examination of it by analyzing influential press comment concerning the military organization seemed to be an unexplored area. The writer's use of the term "Tommy" was not an entirely adequate reflection of the British soldier of Kipling's poem. However, it came close to conveying the writer's intended meaning.

The four hypotheses enumerated in Chapter I were the results of this idea. The findings and conclusions of the preceding three chapters, which discussed quantitative amount, direction and focus, will be briefly summarized in this chapter. The author will also attempt an interpretive conclusion regarding the "Tommy theory" and its validity when compared with this research data. A description of

SECTION IV

DATA CONCLUSIONS

> Qualitative procedures by no means preclude, nor indeed can they preclude alternatives, the use of value judgments, speculations, intelligent guesses on the background and historical fact which the historian, and . . . the social scientist, should bring to his subject. What is gained by attempting such quantification is the circumscribed utility of the fact thus established, not the elimination of subjective factors but the substituting of such more.[1]

The purpose of this study was to analyze a segment of great moment regarding the American military organization during a period when the armed forces became greatly involved in the American society, due to the Second World War and the advent of the Cold War.

The author's basic "Army" theory was formed over several years of both academical and military experience. However, the thought of expanding and testing the validity of the theory did not enter until recently. It was also recognized that the theory was not original, but an accumulation of it by analyzing individual great minds concerning the military organization proved to be an inexplicable area. The author's use of the term "Army" was not in reality adequate substitution of the proper noun of Middle's book. However, it came close to encompassing the author's intended meaning.

The four hypotheses enumerated in Chapter 3 were the results of this idea. The findings and conclusions of the preceding three chapters, which discussed constitutional amendment, Hirshfeld and Ross, will be briefly summarized in this chapter. The author will also attempt to interpretative conclusions regarding the "Army theory" and the military area imparted with this research idea. A consideration of

the coder reliability check used and suggestions for further research will conclude the chapter.

Summary

The quantitative area of this study began with an examination of the amount and type of military comment found in the five newspapers used. Chapter III analyzed the data using three measuring instruments. These were: the number of items found, the number of column inches of space printed for these items and the identification of the type of item. Item type was divided into three parts: editorials, features and letters to the editor. The Washington Post led in both the number of comment items printed and total column inches of space devoted to these items. The Post also led in total editorials and letters to the editor. The New York Times was the feature item leader.

Chapter IV observed the directional emphasis of the study. A Chi-square test was accomplished in this chapter in order to check the statistical significance of the study figures in both wartime and non-wartime contexts. The items were coded in three directional categories. These categories were: favorable, neutral and unfavorable. The Los Angeles Times led the study in the percentage of items found to be favorable to the armed forces. The New York Times and Milwaukee Journal were near the Los Angeles daily in favorability. More than half of all coded comment concerning the military was found to be unfavorable in the Chicago Tribune. The New York Times led the study in the percentage of headlines that were favorable to the services.

the order reliability cases used and suggestions for further research will conclude the chapter.

Summary

The questionnaire data of this study began with an examination of the sample and type of utility commonly found in the Fire Department work. Chapter III analyzed the data dealing with assessing implements. Then after the number of items found, the number of column items of those printed for these items and the identification of the type of item. That type was divided into three parts: utility, decorative and informative in its utility. The analysis then led to the number of months these printed and hand column items of those devoted to these items. The last item led to total activities and hours to the utility. The last item was the factors that tended.

Chapter IV measured the directional tendency of the study. A questionnaire was constructed to this purpose in order to gather the statistical significance of the study. Figures 1, with matrix and descriptive evaluation. The items were asked in three directional categories. These categories were: functional, neutral and informative. The two categories were for the purpose of the relationship of items found to be functional to the other items. The two item items and activities found were used the degree of by in functionality. Some item had of all asked answer concerning the activity and found to be activities in the Fire Department. The two item items and the study to the percentage of respondent had been informed to the activities.

Directional graphic matter was highly favorable in each of the five newspapers, with the highest favorability seen in the New York Times.

Chapter V determined what areas of focus were most prevalent in the study. Seven focal sub-categories were established for the project. They were: social, political, economic, leadership, management, strategy and combination. The study time frame was separated into three sub-periods in order to shrink the cumbersome nature of the table format and create a larger n upon which to base percentage. Management and strategy led all sub-categories in each newspaper examined with a single exception. Leadership was the second most frequent sub-category discovered in the Milwaukee Journal and strategy was third.

Chapters III, IV and V revealed that the four hypotheses of the study were basically confirmed by the research evidence. One exception was noted in Hypothesis II. There was no gradual upward tendency in favorableness of comment toward the armed services approaching World War II. The research showed prewar favorability toward the military to be mixed with no clear pattern established.

The "Tommy theory"

The writer's "Tommy theory" sees a fluctuating American civilian public attitude toward its military organization. In a wartime context, armed services' personnel are accepted and respected by the American public; whereas in peacetime, civilian reactions are something less than favorable. Hypothesis II was developed to check the validity of this theory.

Interviewed people either was highly favorable to each of the five measures, with the highest favorability seen in the five Cases.

Chapter 5 concerned with areas of focus were also particularly in the study. Seven level sub-categories were established for the phase. They were: social, political, economic, technical, management, strategy and evaluation. The study also found the sub-scales into three sub-groups in order to survey the endeavors before of the table frame and create a larger a open which is more persuasive. Management and strategy had all sub-categories in each category associated with a single exception. Technology was the second high frequency sub-category discovered in the interviews. Social and strategy was third.

Chapter III, D and E revealed that the five dimensions of the study were basically confirmed by the interview protocols. The exception was social in Dimension II. There was no general agreement in Dimension II of general issues the same existing organizations social in II. The research across power favorability based the existing is to stand with no clear pattern established.

The Study Results

The research study through had a functioning matrix existing model showed the utility organizations. In a matrix context, areas survival personnel are emerging and therefore by the American public services to provides, civilian research are monitoring data this provides. Therefore it was developed to show the validity of this theory.

If it is accepted that the five study newspapers functioned as opinion leaders in their areas during the time frame used in the research, public attitudes in these areas might have been influenced by the comment printed in these journals. Therefore, the information gathered in the study may have meaning in examining the "Tommy theory." One argument concerning the influence of editorial comment on the newspaper-reading public should be discussed here. Within the field of content analysis studies dealing with journalism research there has been some support for the theory that editorial comment is difficult to read in comparison with objective news writing. The theory continues that such comment should be given little weight when considering press influence on its reader public. A recent content analysis study by Moanette and Harick refuted this theory. They said that "editorials were found to be more readable than news stories."[2]

There is evidence in the study newspapers themselves to show that they recognized the validity of the "Tommy theory." Examples were found in both wartime and non-wartime contexts.

Early in World War II the Washington Post acknowledged that the American people had traditionally paid little attention or respect to their armed forces except in war. When discussing Army Day it said:

> . . . Army Day has never been an occasion to excite the American people. We have been too steeped in pacifism to take more than passing notice of our martial achievements. We have simply tolerated our puny military establishment. We have grudged Army

> appropriations. We have never extended to the soldier the status in our society which he occupies in other countries. . . .
>
> We have never been a military nation. . . .[3]

In 1944 the Chicago Tribune, although often unfavorable in its comment regarding the armed forces, foresaw the importance of the postwar military and offered a glimmer of insight into today's politico-military problems. The comment also showed an attitude relevant to the "Tommy theory." It wrote in an editorial entitled, "The Post-War Army":

> . . . An adequate program of military and naval preparedness will not be accepted by the American people without dissent. Our peace time lapses of the past have not been wholly the fault of the administrators and powers in Washington. The American people do not like military establishments and do not like to spend money on them. That prejudice has to be overcome if the nation is to be made safe. . . .
>
> The wilder the proposals to keep American troops on duty thruout [sic] the world, and to send them to intervene in any quarrel that may arise on any continent, the harder it is going to be to convince the nation of our need for protection. Fathers and mothers of America want no part of a post-war army if it involves making lend-lease mercenaries of their sons.[4]

The Los Angeles Times printed a reader editorial in 1945 that illustrated the "Tommy theory." It said:

> The glamour and flag waving of war are soon forgotten after peace comes and the veteran becomes another "problem.". . .
>
> Nobody would think of having . . . servicemen over for Sunday dinner. The glamour would be missing, it wouldn't be the smart thing to do. . . .[5]

After the war, a New York Times' reader saw an unchanged American attitude. The 1947 letter to the Times said:

> . . . When the times are critical we lean heavily upon our fellow-citizens who have devoted their lives to the Army, Navy and Air Corps. Our whole existence and future and that of our children is then largely in their keeping. Yet after the crisis is successfully passed--to a very substantial degree through their efforts--we lose interest.
>
> Fundamentally this is understandable and sound. Actually, however, is this attitude wise or fair?[6]

In the same year the Milwaukee Journal wrote, ". . . If the American army is demoralized now, the American people have done much to make it so. We are safe and selfish again."[7] The next year the Journal again wrote:

> . . . Americans . . . look with disdain or suspicion on military men and military institutions--that is, until America happens to need those military men to win a war. They look on the peacetime army as a bunch of men strutting around in uniform, killing their own time and wasting taxpayers' money. . . .[8]

The research sample findings indicated that the five newspapers studied did comment much more favorably about the military in the crisis period of the Second World War than was done before or after the conflict. The study sample also uncovered a significant decline in favorability in the first year following the war. A drop was found in each of the five dailies and four of the five lowered favorable comment by over 30 percent. The Chicago Tribune's drop was approximately 10 percent. After 1946, favorability percentages for four of the study journals remained generally lower than their prewar figures. The postwar Tribune military favorability was about 4[illegible] percent. This was near the same level of favor found in the prewar Tribune. The predicted postwar drop was, at first, seen as primarily

an outcome of the inter-service struggle over the establishment of a unified command concept (i.e., the Department of Defense). It was determined, however, that the pronounced decline in favorable comment after the war was due to several additional factors. For example, the 1946 nadir was greatly influenced by national pressure to "bring the boys home" as quickly as possible after the war. There seemed to be a strong public attitude that the armed forces were deliberately slow in discharging personnel. Letters to the editor were very numerous on this point. Unfavorable comment also originated over the civilian fear of the establishment of a military bureaucracy in the American government. The inadequacies of military justice and several other problems found frequent comment in the five dailies. The favorability drop seen in each of the study newspapers in 1949 was predominately caused by the unification struggle.

Prewar favorable comment concerning the military did not compare with the overall wartime level found later in each newspaper. Yet, there was no rising prewar pattern as predicted. The mixed editorial attitude shown by the research may have been a reflection of the American public apprehension due to the spreading war in Europe and the Far East. The policy of isolationism had considerable public support in those years.

The research findings imply a limited correlation between the "Tommy theory" and the newspaper comment observed. The five journals analyzed in the study were picked on the basis of circulation and geographical location. Assuming a reasonable amount of influence on

to reforms of this Indian-Service struggle over the establishment of a uniform Indian knowledge (i.e., the Department of Defense). In the Bureaucrat's opinion, even the presidential decision to Commissioner Collier after the war was due to personal political factors. For example the 1944 Hopi's was greatly influenced by political pressure to "bring the Hopi home" as quickly as possible after the war. There seemed to be a strong public attitude that the Hopi Tribes were deliberately slow in disembarking personnel. Tactics in the Hopi land were brought to this point. Unfavorable climate also originated when the activist fear of the establishment of a military reservation in the American southwest. The transformation of military factors and economic factors finally forced Commissioner Collier to the Hopi Nation. The Hopi Nation then was to meet of the whole government in 1947 was pre-determined by his multifaceted strategies.

Power formidable consent concerning the military did not coincide with the overall political Indian Tribal labor in this government. There was no rating outdoor matters of problems. The broad activist attitude given by the commission may have been a reflection of the American public sympathetic due to the approaching war in Europe and the East. The policy of restrictive and unsatisfactory policy support to Indian people.

The Navajo Challenge imply a limited participation between the "Deep Ranch" and the management consent observed. The Hopi journals employed in the study were focused on the basis of a resolution and precedential decision. Assuming a reasonable amount of criticism in

the general public by the study newspapers and noting the editorial readability factor determined in the Moznette and Rarick study, comment about the armed forces found in these five journals should be considered to be a factor in molding reader opinion toward the nation's military establishment.

Reliability

A reliability test was accomplished with an independent coder to determine the extent of agreement with the writer. The test was taken from the "equivalent forms method" described by Guido H. Stempel III.[9] The test involved a measurement of "identical frequency tabulations" of the material examined by the coders.

The independent coder was instructed on the procedures used in this study and given 20 randomly selected items from the study sample to code. These items were selected from the total number of comment items used in the five newspapers. A table of random numbers found in Content Analysis of Communications was used to make the item selections.[10] The extent of agreement between the independent coding of these items and the original coding was 81 percent.

Suggestions for Further Research

Further research might attempt to carry forward the basic study methodology to the present time. It would be interesting to discover if there was a rise in favorability through the Korean War. Of even more contemporary interest would be a study leading to and through the Vietnam War. The comparison of journalism attitudes

the general public by the study methodology not testing the motivational manipulative factor determined to be a measure for future study. Another point the actual forces found to cause this factor perceived by manipulated to be a factor in altering rather positive causes the subject's attitude manipulations.

Reliability

A reliability test was administered with no independent variable to determine the extent of agreement with the writer. The test was taken from the "motivation from medical" described by Dalton R. Stewart III.[9] The test involved a measurement of "identified fire-fighter subjectivity" of the graphic situation by the writers.

The independent order was determined on the procedures used in this study and given to randomly selected items from the study sample to order. These items were selected from the total number of answers items used in the five questionnaires. A table of random numbers found in Gordon Sagarin of Communications was used to make the item selections.[10] The method of agreement between the independent ordering of these items and the original ordering was 70 percent.

Suggestions for Further Research

Further research might attempt to study factors the basic study methodology in the present time. It would be interesting to discover if there was a time in functionality through the lessons cor. of work-life commitment factors would be a study focusing on and lessons are tailored for. The importance of functionalism activities

toward the military establishment over many years could reveal meaningful data that might be of value to these two influential elements of our society--the press and the military.

A study examining ten rather than five newspapers of the prestige press over a shorter time frame might also be an acceptable project. Differing hypotheses concerning press attitudes toward the military might be tested.

The difference between the "Tommy theory" and the apparent low level of favorable press comment toward the military at the present time would offer an interesting comparison. The present Vietnam War situation seems to offer a paradox to the "Tommy theory" which was found to have some validity in this study.

The research finding of an unusually low favorability percentage in the Chicago Tribune's comment about the armed forces offers a topic for study in itself. Colonel Robert McCormick's personal military background and fervent patriotism seem inconsistent with this low level of favorability. The extremely outspoken editorial policies found in the Tribune regarding isolationism and President Roosevelt in the 1930s and 40s would also be fruitful areas for quantitative research.

Finally, it is suggested that further research develop a new base line evaluation method in testing comment direction. Upon completion of this study, the writer recognized that the directional findings seemed to penalize those newspapers that offered constructive criticism regarding military performance. Such was not the writer's intent.

towards the military establishment under any group which seemed insubordinate enough that it might be of value to keep the individual elements of our society--his power and the military.

A study concluding this section dealt with the emergence of the Peruvian armed forces when a different view from other sides is an independent analysis. Utilizing experienced researching group activities toward the military might be needed.

The difference between the "Power theory" and the economical law level of Ecuadorian armed forces involved the activity of the president that could effect on determining conditions. The president tried the attention based to offer a problem to the "Power theory" action and based to have some validity in this study.

The research finding of an economic law involvability governments in the Chicago Tribune concern about the armed forces effors a trade for study in detail. Colonel Robert Bolivarian's personnel military background and foreign activities have concentration with this law level of involvability. The economic repression activities politics found in the Tribune regarding Latinamerica and Venezuela government in the 1970s and 80s would also be involved across the quantitative research.

Finally, it is suggested that further research design a new case Site qualitative method in testing economic dimensions. Some application of this study, the action recommend that the differentiated theories needed to predicate these investigations that affect economics relations regarding military performance. Such are not the majority issues.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

[1]William O. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History," The American Historical Review, LXXI, No. 3 (1966), p. 819.

[2]James Moznette and Galen Rarick, "Which Are More Readable: Editorials or News Stories?" Journalism Quarterly, XLV No. 2 (1968), p. 321.

[3]Editorial, Washington Post, April 7, 1942, sec. 1, p. 10.

[4]Editorial, Chicago Tribune, April 1, 1944, sec. 1, p. 12.

[5]Editorial, Los Angeles Times, January 15, 1945, sec. 2, p. 4.

[6]Letter to the Times, New York Times, July 7, 1947, sec. 1, p. 16.

[7]Editorial, Milwaukee Journal, January 2, 1947, sec. 1, p. 20.

[8]Ibid., July 11, 1948, sec. 5, p. 2.

[9]Guido H. Stempel III, "Increasing Reliability in Content Analysis," Journalism Quarterly, XXXII, No. 3 (1955), p. 449.

[10]Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp and Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communication (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 17.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

[1]Philip G. Altbach, "Educational Reform in Kenya," The American Political Review, LXIX, No. 1 (1969), p. [illegible].

[2]Jean Kennedy and John Burke, "Video are more feasible: educators in Ross Shortcut" Instructor Quarterly, [illegible] No. 7 (1969), p. [illegible].

[3]Editorial, Washington Post, April 7, 1971, sec. 2, p. 20.

[4]Editorial, Chicago Tribune, April 1, 1971, sec. 1, p. 12.

[5]Editorial, Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1971, sec. 7, p. [illegible]

[6]Letter to the Times, New York Times, July 7, 1971, sec. 1, p. 16.

[7]Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 1971, sec. 2, p. [illegible]

[8]Ibid., July 21, 1969 sec. 2, p. [illegible]

[9]Orlie A. Arnold III, "Increasing Efficiency in Student Analysis," Instructor Quarterly, [illegible] No. 3 (1970) p. [illegible].

[10]Kenneth V. Wood, Robert C. Tuck and Louis Duncan, Operant Analysis of Classroom Behavior (New York: The Ross Co., 1971) p. 21.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Operational definitions used were:

FAVORABLE

Those items reflecting cohesion, cooperation, stability and/or strength. Favorability will be judged on the basis of armed forces cooperation in which the armed forces or any group or individual representing the armed forces, is depicted as strong, right or cooperative. In internal affairs, favorability will be judged on the basis of persons or groups cooperating in military affairs. For example, events and incidents which depict the armed forces, or any group or individual within the armed forces as progressive, successful, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified or as exercising leadership will be considered favorable. This classification will not be assigned where the armed forces or any group or individual thereof, is depicted as exploiting its strength upon weaker organizations, groups or individuals.

UNFAVORABLE

Those items which report conflict and disorganization and military instability and/or weakness. Unfavorability will be judged on the basis of tensions in which the armed forces, or any group or individual representing the armed forces, is depicted as weak, wrong or uncooperative. In internal affairs, unfavorability will be judged on the basis of military disruption in which there is conflict between

APPENDIX A

Operational Definitions Used Herein

FAMILIARITY

Those items relating familiarity, conversation, activity involvement. Conversationality will be judged on the basis of issue driven conversations in which the sexual theme is not group or individual movement. The sexual theme, as displayed on screen, might be suggestive. In internal affairs, conversationality will be judged on the basis of persons in groups conversing in activity activity. The activity, which not involving sexual theme, or any group or individual which the sexual theme is irrelevant, conversational music, conditions, lighting, medical or is controlling behavioral and environmental surroundings. This dimensionality will not be assigned where the sexual theme on any group or individual theme, is displayed as exploiting the strength over weaker individuals, group or individuals.

INTERACTIVITY

Those items dated behavior modifier and manipulative, and activity involvity modify measures. Interactivity will be judged on the basis of behavior in which the sexual theme, or any group or individual involvedting the sexual theme, is expressed in some, among or manipulative. In internal affairs, interactivity will be judged on the basis of activity dimensions in which theme is evaluated among

persons or groups of persons within the armed forces in military affairs. For example, events and incidents which depict the armed forces, or any group or individual within the armed forces, as backward, unmilitary, immoral, impractical, unlawful, disunified or lacking in leadership will be classified as unfavorable.

NEUTRAL

Those items which reflect neither favorable or unfavorable condition either through balance of content or lack of controversial material.

EDITORIAL

Written expression of biased opinion regarding persons, places, things and events.

FEATURE

Written expression of fact and/or opinion regarding a subject of particular interest.

LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR

Any written correspondence submitted to a newspaper by one of its readers and subsequently printed in that newspaper.

COMMENT

The sum of three forms of journalistic printed matter defined above (i.e., editorials, feature and letter-to-the-editor).

persons or groups of persons within the local forces in utilizing efforts. For example, groups and individuals within special the local forces; or any group or individual within the local forces, on based, emotional, rational, instinctual, material, theoretical or leading in leadership will be classified as motivators.

Control

These forces which restrain persons from or encourage conditions within through sources of control or lack of motivational material.

Conflicts

Various expressions of biased opinion regarding various plans, ideas and events.

Feedback

Various expressions of fact which indicate regarding a change of conditions involved.

Interrelationship

The various correlations existing in a community by use of the energy and economic systems in that community.

Change

For the of these forces of leadership which are under control there (i.e., activists, follow and indecisive-leaders).

SOCIAL

Opinion regarding the involvement of the armed forces in group or individual relationships with other groups or individuals.

POLITICAL

Opinion regarding the involvement of the armed forces in other governmental (less military) affairs.

ECONOMIC

Opinion regarding the involvement of the armed forces in financial (including budgetary) matters.

LEADERSHIP

Opinion regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces (individual, group or unit) in commanding respect and/or achieving discipline.

MANAGEMENT

Opinion regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces in directing and/or training personnel and directing and/or developing material.

STRATEGY

Opinion regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces in planning and carrying out warfare (primarily during conflict).

[illegible]

Question regarding the involvement of the armed forces in group or individual relationships with other groups or individuals.

[illegible]

Question regarding the involvement of the armed forces in social development (land utilizing) activity.

[illegible]

Question regarding the involvement of the armed forces in financial (including budgetary) matters.

[illegible]

Question regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces (manifestos, press or radio) in responding regions major or minor [illegible].

[illegible]

Question regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces in [illegible] minor activity promoted and [illegible] major demonstration [illegible].

[illegible]

Question regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces in [illegible] the [illegible] activity [illegible].

APPENDIX B

The coding sheet design was:

Newspaper	Date	Section	Page	Column Inches	Type of Item
1 N Y T					1 Editorial
2 W P T-H					2 Feature
3 C T					3 Letter to Editor
4 M J					
5 L A T					

Direction toward Armed Forces	Focus toward Armed Forces	Direction of Headline	Direction of Photo or Editorial Cartoon
3 Favorable	1 Social	3 Favorable	3 Favorable
2 Neutral	2 Political	2 Neutral	2 Neutral
1 Unfavorable	3 Economic	1 Unfavorable	1 Unfavorable
	4 Leadership	0 None	0 None
	5 Management		
	6 Strategy		
	7 Combination		

Coding unit to be used: article

APPENDIX A

The coding sheet design was:

Respondent	Date	Question	Item	Column Number	Type of Item
1. S T T				1	Identity
2. M T T-G				2	Family
3. S.T				3	Letter to Editor
4. A.J					
5. S.A.F					

Columns Leading Based Phone	Phone Leading Based Phone	Telephone of Respondent	Identity of Phone Called Further
1. Barrenville	1. Bedell	1. Farmingville	1. Farmingville
2. Medford	2. Holtsville	2. Ronkonkoma	2. Bellport
3. Selden-Middle	3. Shoreham	3. Sayville-Middle	3. Selden-Middle
	4. Sayville-Middle	4. Other	4. Other
	5. Ronkonkoma		
	6. Patchogue		
	7. Farmingville		

Coding sheet is for Leader Activity

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Alman, John E. and White, David M. "Statistical Methods in Communications Research." Introduction to Mass Communications Research. Edited by Ralph O. Nafziger and David M. White. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963.

Budd, Richard W., Thorp, Robert K., and Donohew, Lewis. Content Analysis of Communications. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967.

Charnley, Mitchell V. Reporting. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966.

Cutlip, Scott M. and Center, Allen H. Effective Public Relations. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964.

Editor and Publisher 1944 Annual. New York.

Editor and Publisher 1949 Annual. New York.

Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1963.

Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960.

Kipling, Rudyard. "Tommy." English Literature and Its Backgrounds. Edited by Bernard D. Grebanier, Samuel Middlebrook, Stith Thompson, and William Watt. New York: The Dryden Press, 1939.

Millis, Walter and Duffield, E. S., ed. The Forrestal Diaries. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.

Rivers, William L. The Opinionmakers. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1965.

Stimson, Henry L. and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.

ARTICLES

Aydelotte, William O. "Quantification in History." The American Historical Review, LXXI (April, 1966), 803.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Cohen, John S. and White, David M. "Voluntary Behavior in Communication Science Research." Introduction to Some Communication Research. Edited by Walter G. Miller and David M. White. Boston: Boston University Press, 1963.

Edel, Abraham V., Sharp, Robert E., and Dworkin, Martin. Ethics and Analysis of Common Morality. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963.

Gerstner, Kenneth V. Advertising. New York, Hill, Standard and Blanton, Inc., 1962.

Haley, Bernd E. and Dayer, Allan E. Effective Public Relations. Columbus Ohio: E. L. Stoneleigh Inc., 1963.

Editor and Publisher 1963 Annual. New York.

Editor and Publisher 1964 Annual. New York.

Hungry Jackline. Nations, Cultures and Language. New York: Dell Publishing Co. Inc., 1963.

Kennedy, Kevin. The Technical Jungle. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1963.

Kipling, Rudyard. "Song." Rudyard Kipling's Verse and The Seven Seas. Edited by Kenneth G. Grahame, Second Edition, Revised, Edinburgh: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd. New York: The Dodge Press, 1933.

Mills, Quinn and Duffield, G. W., ed. The Successful Writer. New York: The Ronald Press, 1963.

Reeves, William G. The Communicators. Boston: The Bruce Press, 1962.

Schwarz, Henry L. and Kemp, Anthony. In Service Service. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962.

ARTICLES

Lipschitz, William G. "Consultation in Industry." The American Clinical Journal (April, 1963), 8-12.

Davis, F. James and Turner, Lester W. "Sample Efficiency in Quantitative Newspaper Analysis." Public Opinion Quarterly, XV (Winter, 1951), 762-63.

Moznette, James and Rarick, Galen. "Which Are More Readable: Editorials or News Stories." Journalism Quarterly. XLV (Summer, 1968), 321.

Stempel, Guido H. III. "Increasing Reliability in Content Analysis." Journalism Quarterly, XXXII (Fall, 1955), 449.

NEWSPAPERS

Chicago Tribune, January 1, 1937 - December 31, 1949.

Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1937 - December 31, 1949.

Milwaukee Journal, January 1, 1937 - December 31, 1949.

New York Times, January 1, 1937 - December 31, 1949.

Washington Post, January 1, 1937 - December 31, 1949.

MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Raymond Clapper Papers.

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Elmer Davis Papers.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Budd, Richard W. "A Study of News Concerning the United States in Four Australian and Four New Zealand Metropolitan Daily Newspapers." Unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Iowa, 1962.

Coats, Wendell J. and Mulkey, Steven W. "The Selection and Validation of a Representative Sample of United States Daily Newspapers." Unpublished M. A. research paper, University of Wisconsin, 1949.

Knutson, Sidney A. "History of the Public Relations Program in the United States Army." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1953.

Larson, Charles Wesley II. "Survival Equals Success: History of the U.S. Navy Public Information Specialty, 1945-64." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971.

Davis, R. James and Turner, Lawrence A. "Study Strategy in Constitutive Descriptive Analysis." Public Opinion Quarterly, 29 (Winter, 1965), 99-[illegible].

Eisenstein, James and Sarick, Gaian. "Which Are More Reasonable: Materials or Home Services?" Journalism Quarterly, 32 (Summer, 1968), 321.

Stempel, Guido H. III. "Determining Authenticity in Content Analysis." Journalism Quarterly, XXXII (Fall, 1967), 333.

NEWSPAPERS

Chicago Tribune, January 1, 1977 - December 31, 1977.

Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1977 - December 31, 1977.

Minneapolis Tribune, January 1, 1977 - December 31, 1977.

New York Times, January 1, 1977 - December 31, 1977.

Washington Post, January 1, 1977 - December 31, 1977.

SECONDARY COLLECTIONS

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Ogden Mills Papers.

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Elihu Root Papers.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Bush, Donald A. "A Study of Some Correlates for Social Status in Four Industrial and Four Non Industrial Metropolitan Daily Newspapers." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Iowa, 1[illegible].

Edwards, Russell C. and Bishop, Gordon A. "The Selection and Validation of a Correlative Index of Social Status Daily Newspaper." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Ohio University, University of Minnesota, 1[illegible].

Hudson, Sidney A. "History of the Public Relations Program in the United States Army." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1[illegible].

Lawson, Clifton Wesley III. "Statistic Media Business, History of the U.S. Army Public Information Specialist, 1[illegible]." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1[illegible].

Lindsay, Robert G. "History of the Public Relations Program in the United States Marine Corps." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1954.

Loving, Howard H. "Coverage of the 1969 French Presidential Campaign and Election by Ten Prestige Newspapers." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971.

Pappas, George S. "The Refinement of Procedure for the Selection and Testing of a Representative Sample of the Daily Press of the United States." Unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1950.

Scovel, F. Donald. "Helm's A'Lee, History of the Development of the Public Affairs Function in the United States Navy, 1861-1941." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968.

MISCELLANEOUS

Young, Robert A. Personal letter file.

Lindsay, Robert B. "Glossary of the Public Relations Program in the United States Naval Reserve Corps." Unpublished M.A. Thesis. University of Virginia, 1951.

Lowry, Susan C. "Summary of the 1950 Press Presidential Campaign and Election by Two Presidential Candidates." Unpublished M.A. Thesis. University of Virginia, 1951.

Rippon, George E. "The Relationship of Training in the Selection and Training of a Representative Sample of the Daily Press of the United States." Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1950.

Sowell, F. Theodore. "Thesis & Jew, Library of the Department of the Public Affairs Division in the United States Navy, 1941-1951." Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1953.

ARTICLES

Perry, Warren S. "Personnel Review Film."

Thesis 129090
Y68 Young
A content study of
five influential
U. S. daily newspapers.